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In the Supretne Court 
of the State of Utah 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N·A., a corporation, as Executor of 
the ESTATE OF JAMES C. DEMI-
RIS, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
IPHIGENIA P. DEMIRIS, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
MARGARET A DEMIRIS PAP ACAS-
TAS, CONSTANTINO C. DEMI-
RIS, ATHANASIOS DEMIR IS, 
PETER DEMIRIS and JOHN DEM-
IRIS, 
Intervenors and Appellants. 
Case No. 
8982 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND 
CROSS APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is taken by the plaintiff and appellant, 
First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., a corporation, as ex-
ecutor of the estate of James C. Demiris, Deceased, and 
by the intervenors and appellants, the brothers and sister 
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of James C. Demiris from a judgment entered against 
them and in favor of this defendant and respondent, Iphi-
genia Demiris, surviving widow of James C. Demiris. The 
action was tried without a jury before the Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court. 
The appellants' brief contains an Introduction and a 
Statement of Facts and we will set forth herein the facts 
with which the defendant agrees, the facts recited by ap-
pellants with which she takes issue and other facts not 
referred to by appellants in their brief. 
It is agreed that appellants went to trial in September, 
1958, on their third amended complaint, which contained 
two causes of action. The first cause of action sought to 
recover from defendant the sum of $38,404.45, which was 
the amount allegedly obtained by her from four bank 
accounts transferred by James C. Demiris into joint ten-
ancy accounts with defendant on December_ 5, 1956 
(R. 41) . The first cause of action further alleged that at 
the time the accounts were changed on December 5, James 
C. Demiris was mentally incompetent, and that defendant 
exercised and perpetrated fraud and undue influence on 
the said James C. Demiris (R. 42). The second cause of 
action of the third amended complaint sought to recover 
the sum of $82,746.74 which was the total of eight bank 
accounts, including the four accounts set forth in the 
first cause of action, and United States Savings Bonds 
having an alleged value of $9,700.00. It was alleged that 
between December 21, 1956, and prior to the death of 
James C. Demiris on January 23, 1957, defendant with-
drew all of the funds of the bank accounts and cashed all 
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of the bonds and converted the proceeds thereof to her 
own use (R. 43). 
At the conclusion of the trial the court found that 
three of the bank accounts .claimed by plaintiff in its first 
cause of action and totalling $28,404. 45 were transferred 
by James C. Demiris from his own personal funds into ac-
counts in joint tenancy with rights of survivorship with 
the defendant on December 5, 1956, and that prior to the 
death of James C. Demiris on January 23, 1957, the de-
fendant withdrew the funds from these accounts and re-
tained possession of them (R. 49). The court further 
found that four additional bank accounts and the United 
States Savings Bonds set forth in the second cause of action 
were held by the decedent and the defendant as joint ten-
ants and that between December 21, 1956 and January 23, 
1957, the defendant withdrew the funds from these ac-
counts and cashed the bonds and retained the funds in 
her possession ( R. 49) . 
The court further found that between November 28, 
1956 and December 15, 1956, the decedent visited with 
friends on several occasions and that on such occasions he 
conversed normally and intelligently and there was noth-
ing unusual about his conduct; that prior to December 
11, 1956, he was able to remember the natural objects of 
his bounty and to recall to mind his property and dispose 
of it according to a plan formed in his mind; that on 
December 5, 1956, when the accounts claimed in plaintiff's 
first cause of action were transferred to joint tenancy the 
decedent, James C. Demiris, was legally competent, that he 
did not lack testamentary capacity and was not acting 
under any undue influence and that the transfers of ac-
counts by said decedent on December 5, 1956, were trans-
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actions in the nature of gifts in .contemplation of death; 
that prior to December 15, 1956, the decedent was capable 
of conducting his own business affairs and that at no time 
was the defendant a confidential adviser of the decedent 
and that the withdrawal of the funds by the defendant and 
the cashing of the bonds during the lifetime of the deceased 
did not cause a severance of the joint tenancy (R. 50-51). 
It is agreed that James C. Demiris emigrated from 
Greece to America in 1902, and that two of his brothers, 
John and Peter, came to America in 1906 and 1907, re-
spectively (R. 187). The other two brothers, Gus and 
Tom and the sister, Margaret, remained in Greece and 
Margaret, one of the intervenors, had died prior to the 
time of trial (R. 187). In 1925 James C. Demiris returned 
to Greece and married the defendant, Iphigenia. The 
appellants, in their statement of facts, state that while 
defendant and decedent were married some 31 years, the 
defendant went to Greece in 1928 and again in 1935, and 
they were separated approximately 13 years of this time 
(App. Br. 5). It should be noted, however, with respect 
to defendant's trips to Greece, that the defendant testified 
that she visited relatives in Greece in 1929 and came back 
in 1930 (R. 71) and returned to visit her sick mother in 
1936, was told by her husband to stay for a little while, 
and before she could return, the outbreak of World War 
II prevented her return until 1946 (R. 123) making a 
combined absence of eleven years. She testified that while 
she was in Greece her husband wrote her letters and sent 
her about $5,000.00 for her living expenses. 
With respect to the relationship between the defend-
ant and Jim, the defendant testified that during the time 
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Jim owned the Pacific Hotel the defendant worked in the 
hotel making beds and rooms for about three or four years 
(R. 124) ; that she and her husband got along just like 
any other couples, sometimes quarreling and sometimes 
making up, and the quarrels would last sometimes from 
15 to 30 minutes (R. 73); that many of the quarrels re-
sulted when Jim refused to go with her to visit his brothers, 
and Jim would tell her she could go visit his brothers alone, 
but that he would not go (R. 74-75). The defendant 
denied that she was ever offered $10,000.00 if she would 
divorce Jim (R. 76) and Mr. Callister, himself, did not 
remember whether the offer was ever communicated to 
Mrs. Demiris (R. 172). 
Appellants contend that a close relationship existed 
between Jim and his brothers, John and Peter, in support 
of their position that Jim intended to provide generously 
for them in his wills, drawn on March 19, 25, and 26, 1952 
(App. Br. 4, 5, 6). They significantly failed, however, to 
mention the previous will, Exhibit D-7, dated December 
30, 1947, wherein the decedent left $1000.00 each to his 
two brothers and one sister in Greece, but left nothing at 
all for his brothers John and Peter, notwithstanding their 
forty-odd years of business association. The entire residue 
of his estate in the 1947 will was to go to the defendant. 
In connection with the execution of the wills in 1952, it 
should be noted that Mr. Callister testified that these wills 
were made at a time when Jim and the defendant were 
contemplating a trip to Greece and Jim was afraid that 
if defendant's relatives were named as beneficiaries in the 
will, they might poison him when he got to Greece. 
Appellants contend that after Jim and defendant 
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returned from their trip to Greece in 1952, their quarrel-
ing and marital troubles continued and cite the testimony 
of six of their witnesses to support their position. It should 
be noted, however, with respect to the testimony of one 
tenant who .called the police on the occasion of a quarrel, 
that the incident happened about eight years ago and that 
the tenant who called the police had recently moved into 
the apartment and was not acquainted with the decedent 
and the defendant, but later became their good friend 
(R. 355). John Condas saw Jim in the summer, not late 
summer, of 1956, and nothing was said about Jim's wife 
except that she ((Kind of hammered the thing, to go back 
to Europe" (R. 183). John Pragastis, who had discussed 
marital troubles with Jim, admitted on cross-examination 
that he, himself, was having troubles with his wife and 
would talk about his troubles to Jim (R. 212); John's wife 
had just returned from a trip to Greece that summer (R. 
208). The testimony of Ted Jouflas (App. Br. 7) should 
include his statement that in the conversation on the cor-
ner of 3rd South and Main Street, the defendant was ask-
ing Jim to go on a trip or something (R. 228). 
Respondent presents the following summary of addi-
tional testimony of witnesses referred to in appellants,. 
brief: 
Alke Diamant, upon cross-examination, admitted 
that he had previously told counsel for the defendant that 
he could not remember what the decedent had said relative 
to the provisions in the will, and that the decedent said he 
wanted to change the will but didn't tell how; that the last 
time Alke saw the decedent was the last part of October 
or early November. The decedent told Alke that he had 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
several bank accounts and most of them were in joint 
names with his wife (R. 222-223). Commencing on line 
seven (R. 224) Mr. Diamant answered questions as 
follows: 
Q. Do you remember telling Mr. Swan and me 
that he told you he had several bank accounts 
and most of them were in joint names with his 
wife? 
A Correct, that was true. That is absolutely cor-
rect. I think he said he had, because I remember 
one conversation when he made that statement. 
I says, HW ell, Jim, if you have a desire to leave 
anything to your brothers and sister you have to 
be careful not to have all your accounts jointly." 
And I think he said that, (ti have two or three 
accounts. They are in my name." And also that 
he was entitled to som·e money from the sale of the 
Oakwood. 
But Jim was a peculiar duck. He wouldn't 
tell me. I guess he didn't want me to know how 
much money he was worth. But I had a fairly good 
idea the way he spoke, how much the man was 
worth. 
Mr. Floyd R. Long, account clerk in the Trust De-
partment for First Security Bank, Fourth South Branch, 
testified that he first met Jim in 1946 and took care of 
managing the Oakwood apartments for him (R. 320); 
that Jim would come in once or twice a month and that 
after Jim sold the Oakwood apartments the bank made 
collections of the note from Elmer Butler and dispersed 
the payments 264/400 to James Demiris and 63/400 each 
to Peter and John Demiris (R. 321); that the Elmer But-
ler note, the abstract of the property, and the mortgage 
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release had been in possession of the bank for collection 
and handling for about five years and since the bank began 
handling the collections, James Demiris would come into 
the office two or three times a month, and if the payment 
happened to be late he would be in more often (R. 322). 
On December 10, 1956, Mr. and 11rs. Demiris came into 
the bank and came up to the teller's window and Mr. Long 
gave the following account of the conversation: (R. 323) 
Q And who spoke to you first? 
A Mr. Demiris. 
Q And what did he say? 
A Well, I don't recall the exact words. He started 
saying that he wanted to put his wife's name on 
the remittance, on his check that we mailed out 
to him. 
Q Did he say anything else? 
A He said he would like her to be able to cash the 
check, in case he was sick or something she 
could ·Cash it and have some money. 
Q Did he say anything else? 
A He asked me what would have to be done to be 
able to put her name on it, and I told him he 
would have to give us a memorandum signed by 
both of them, and after that I drew this mem-
orandum up and had them both sign it. 
Mr. Long said the very first approach was made by Jim 
before any conversation took place between Jim and the 
Defendant (R. 324 and R. 330). The memorandum pre-
pared by Mr. Long was Exhibit D-20 which Mr. Demiris 
picked up first and started reading and then signed with-
out hesitation (R. 325). There was nothing unusual or 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
different about Jim's appearance on this occasion than on 
previous occasions. The wording on Exhibit D-20 ccJames 
Demir is or I phigenia Demir is" was the terminology of Mr. 
Long to enable defendant to cash the check alone since 
Jim said he wanted her to be able to cash the check alone 
(R. 325). Mr. Long identified Exhibit D-21 which was 
a stub portion of a check which the bank had made to 
James Demir is or I phigenia Demir is in the sum of $ 3 40.44 
pursuant to the instructions in Exhibit D-20. Mr. Long 
said he was in the presence of Jim and the defendant about 
20 or 30 minutes on December lOth, and from the time 
they first approached until the time they signed and left 
he noticed nothing unusual about Mr. Demiris (R. 327); 
and in response to questions put to him by the Court, Mr. 
Long said that there was nothing unusual about the entire 
transaction (R. 3 31). 
Mr. Ebenezer John Kirkham testified that he is an 
insurance salesman who first met Jim in 1922; that on 
about the lOth or 12th of December he met Jim and his 
wife near the New Grand Hotel on 4th South Street; that 
he spent five or ten minutes just passing the time of day 
with them (R. 3 3 3) and noticed nothing unusual about 
him and in fact was much surprised when he learned of 
his death (R. 3 34). 
Mrs. Bombas testified that she had been friends of 
James Demiris and his wife for about seven or eight years, 
and that Mr. and Mrs. Demiris would visit at her house 
every two or three weeks ( R. 3 3 7) ; that the last time Mr. 
and Mrs. Demiris were at her house on December 4th or 
5th, they stayed about three or four hours during which 
time they talked and Mrs. Bombas noticed nothing un-
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usual about Mr. Demiris (R. 339). On about December 
11th or 12th she was at Mr. Demitis' house and stayed a 
couple of hours; that her husband was with her and they 
talked in Greek about general subjects (R. 3 3 8) and the 
witness noticed nothing unusual about Mr. Demiris; that 
Jim talked nice and seemed happy (R. 343). 
Mrs. Tiano, a housewife and an employee of Utah 
Woolen Mills said she was a good friend of Mr. and Mrs. 
Demiris and met them about eight years ago (R. 345). 
During a period of about a year before Jim's death they 
would stop and visit Mr. and Mrs. Demiris two or three 
times a month. She and her husband saw Mr. and Mrs. 
Demiris three times between the :first of December and the 
13th (R. 345). The visits between December 1st and 13th 
were about an hour each, and on these occasions Mr. and 
Mrs. Demiris were present and participated in the con-
versation. On the morning of December 13th, she and 
her husband were leaving for California and went to say 
good-bye to Mr. and Mrs. Demiris, and while talking 
about a vacation Mr. Demiris said, uMaybe I will make a 
trip to California one of these days," and the witness 
noticed nothing unusual about his conversation (R. 346). 
Mrs. O'Connell testified that she and her husband 
have resided at the Oakwood apartments for the past 15 
years, and during that time they were well acquainted with 
James Demiris (R. 349). She visited with Mr. Demiris 
frequently (R. 349). During the month of November, 
1956, she visited with him on several occasions and some-
times the visits were one-half to three-quarters of an hour, 
and he seemed to enjoy conversing with her (R. 350}. 
Between December 1st and 15th she saw him practically 
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every day and would visit with him for a few minutes. He 
told her his feet bothered him, to which she answered that 
he was walking too much (R. 3 51) ; then he told the 
witness he couldn't read so much any more because his 
eyes bothered him and he either said he had or would go 
to an eye doctor (R. 352). Mrs. O'Connell noticed noth-
ing unusual about any of the conversations with Mr. Dem-
iris before he went to the hospital except that towards the 
last he appeared sick ( R. 3 52) ; she said that James always 
recognized her (R. 3 52). On cross-examination, Mrs. 
O'Connell said she remembered telling Mr. Fullmer that 
she did not notice any difference in the latter portion of 
Mr. Demiris' life until he got sick, and then he just seemed 
to kind of give up (R. 3 55). 
Mrs. Helen Tsimpoukis testified that she is a widow 
who now works for Pike's Manufacturing (R. 356); that 
she had known James Demiris since 1921 and his wife 
since 1926, and had visited with them frequently ever 
since the Demirises were married; that most of the visits 
were in her house because her husband, while he was liv-
ing, didn't like to go visit in the hotel (R. 357); that in 
December 1956, she saw Mr. Demiris several times (R. 
357). On December 7th, a Friday night, Mr. and Mrs. 
Demiris came while she was doing house cleaning and 
stayed about 45 minutes and seemed to be very happy, and 
when she asked why they were happy they said, ((He went 
to the bank and changed the books." (R. 358); that on 
this occasion they talked at length and had coffee and re-
freshments and she noticed nothing different about Jim 
on that visit of December 7th. About a week later, pos-
sibly December 12th or 13th, they came at night and 
stayed quite long, maybe a couple of hours. Mr. and Mrs. 
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Demiris visited with her as usual, but after a couple of 
hours Mr. Demiris said he felt tired and wanted to go 
home, but she didn't notice anything unusual or wrong 
with him other than he mentioned he was tired and 
wanted to go home (R. 359). On December 19th or 20th, 
since Jim and his wife had not come to visit her, she went 
over to Jim's apartment and found Jim sick in bed and 
Virginia was worried (R. 3 60). It was on this occasion 
that he told her there was a .crowd of people outside the 
window (R. 3 61) and he refused to eat. On cross-exam-
ination Mrs. Tsimpoukis said in her opinion Jim and his 
wife got along all right; even though they had fights, they 
would be all right again after a few minutes (R. 363); 
that Jim would talk to people he liked to talk to and if 
he didn't like the person he would not talk (R. 3 65) ; that 
no one could get any money out of Jim if he didn't want 
them to have it (R. 375); that because Jim never gave 
his wife very much while they were married, she thought 
his wife should be entitled to all of the money (R. 376). 
Mrs. Georgia Demas, age 67, was in ill health at the 
time of the trial, and her deposition was published in part. 
She said she is a widow who lives at the Oakwood apart-
ments; that she had known James Demiris for over 30 
years· (R. 379) and that she came to live in the Oakwood 
apartments in 1956 (R. 380). For two months before 
Jim went to the hospital she had a chance to see him and 
talked to him many times since he lived in the apartment 
next door (R. 3 81) , and they talked in Greek all of the 
time. She had talked with him during the period of about 
a week before he went to see Doctor Powell, and she 
noticed nothing wrong before he went to the Doctor 
(R. 383); but after he had gone to Dr. Powell he appeared 
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quite sick (R. 3 85). Jim never wanted to go visit his 
brothers, although Mrs. Demiris would try to get him to 
go for such visits (R. 386). One day she remembered Jim 
and his wife going up town and the next day Jim talked 
wi-th her at length and said ((Mrs. Demas, I've drawn my 
books and the money to my wife" (R. 387). During this 
long visit she noticed nothing wrong or unusual about him 
(R. 388). 
Miss Helen Demiris, daughter of Peter Demiris (R. 
407) said that on November 25th, 1956, she found out for 
the :first time that Jim had made a will and his will had 
mentioned the brothers and one sister (R. 410) . She re-
layed this information to her father and possibly her Uncle 
John ( R. 411 ) . 
Mrs. Olympia Demiris, wife of Peter Demiris testi-
fied that she had heard of James's will on November 25th 
( R. 415) , but admitted that when her deposition was 
taken several months before, she denied that she ever heard 
about the will; but at the time of trial she said she meant 
to say that she had never heard about the will from Jim 
(R. 416), even though the specific questions were as 
follows: 
HQ Did Jim ever talk to you about his Will?" 
A To me,. no. James, no. 
Q HQ Did you know that he had a will?" 
A From him, no. From Jim, never. 
Q ttQ You never heard about the will?" 
A I heard from Mrs. Tsimpoukis only. 
Q You didn't say that at the time, did you? 
A Well, there was too many gentlemen. I guess 
it slipped my mind, but I meant about Mrs. 
Tsimpoukis. 
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Q Let me read you the answer you gave at that 
time, and you tell me whether or not that is 
what you said. 
uQ Did Jim ever talk to you about his will? 
uA No. 
uQ Did you know that he had a will? 
uA No. 
uQ You never heard about the will? 
uA No." 
MEDICAL TESTIMONY 
Dr. Adelai E. Callaghan testified that he is a licensed 
physician of the State of Utah with an M.D. Degree from 
the University of Maryland, and his speciality is in the 
:field of eye, ear, nose and throat, and he has been engaged 
in practice since 1934 (R. 274); that on November 28, 
1956, he examined James Demiris; that an office assistant 
obtained a history and then the doctor proceeded with an 
examination in which he found Jim was suffering from 
cataracts and his vision was reduced rather sharply, but 
could be improved with new glasses (R. 27 6) ; that his 
vision was 20/50 in either eye and constituted a consider-
able handicap in connection with gett~ng about the town 
and traversing streets in traffic (R. 277) ; that Mrs. Dem-
iris accompanied Jim at the examination and that as 
routine procedure he advised that it was not safe for Jim 
to be traveling alone (R. 277); that Jim was instructed to 
return three days later, on November 30th, which he did 
and his prescription was checked while wearing the cor-
rection (R. 278) . That the entire examination requires a 
minimum of one hour and a quarter, and the doctor was 
personally with the patient for approximately 45 minutes. 
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In the .course of the examination he asked the patient to 
make choices in connection with his ability to see certain 
things, dilated the pupils so the eyes could be examined, 
and then completed the examination with trial frame 
lenses (R. 278); during the course of the examination he 
asked the patient many times what he was able to see and 
with which lense he could s·ee better. It would take 
about 25 minutes in this question and answer procedure. 
During this entire time the response of James Demiris was 
normal and there was nothing unusual about his responses 
(R. 279). 
Doctor Phillip Murray Howard testified that he is 
licensed to practice medicine in the State of Utah and on 
De.cember 1st he examined James Demiris (R. 163). The 
doctor said the complaints were such that he could not 
quite make heads or tails of why he was there, but con-
cluded it was for a general physical examination, since he 
had some complaint of leg pains resulting from the long 
walks (R. 164) . The doctor said he made a superficial 
examination and concluded from the external examination 
that Mr. Demiris was physically normal. He made no in-
vestigation or examination of his mental capacity (R. 
165). The doctor said that Jim was rather dull mentally 
and did not appear to answer or comprehend questions 
(R. 165) yet in answer to a question from the Court, 
stated Mr. Demiris communicated in the English language 
very adequately (R. 166). It is noted here that Dr. How-
ard had never seen Jim Demiris before this day, and was 
Helen Demiris' doctor (R. 306). On cross-examination 
Dr. Howard said Mr. Demiris appeared to him to be ra-
tional (R. 166). The doctor also said he noted on his card 
that the forgetfulness mentioned was probably secondary 
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to cerebral arteriosclerosis, but that he did not prescribe 
any treatment, did not suggest Mr. Demiris return to him 
at a later date, and did not refer him to anyone else for 
treatment (R. 165). 
Dr. George Diumenti testified that he is a licensed 
physician and surgeon of the State of Utah and has prac-
ticed since 1940 at Bountiful, Utah, (R. 282). On De-
cember 14, 19 56, James Demiris came to his office with his 
wife and a brother. The chief complaint was forgetful-
ness which was given either by the wife or the brother 
(R. 2 8 3 ) . The doctor excluded the wife and brother from 
the room and continued the examination of the patient. 
Jim was responsive to the questions. The patient was given 
a complete general physical examination and the findings 
were negative (R. 284-285). However, since the chief 
complaint was forgetfulness the doctor felt he should refer 
the patient to a specialist to rule out any skull injury, brain 
tumor, or arteriosclerosis. The doctor discussed this re-
ferral with Jim and remembers definitely having asked 
Jim if he was able to take care of the medical expense or 
that if he didn't have the finances, the doctor would send 
him to the County Hospital; and Jim responded that he 
was financially able to take care of himself (R. 29 5) . Jim 
was then referred to Dr. Powell. The next time the doctor 
saw Jim was at the hospital a day or two after his admis-
sion, at which time the doctor was greatly surprised and 
impressed with his very severe deterioration (R. 290). At 
the hospital Jim didn't recognize the doctor and didn't 
seem to answer or want to answer the questions. 
Dr. Chester B. Powell testified that he is a specialist 
in the practice of neuro-surgery (R. 125). The doctor 
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could not remember any specific history given to him by 
the wife except that she was greatly concerned and hoped 
that the doctor would do something for him (R. 129); 
that Jim had a severe loss of appetite which particularly 
concerned Mrs. Demiris (R. 130). The doctor was unable 
during the lifetime of Jim Demiris to determine whether 
he was suffering from acute senile degeneration or from 
cerebral arteriosclerosis (R. 13 3) . and did not distinguish 
the cause until after receiving the results of the autopsy (R. 
13 5). The doctor, in stating the characteristics of persons 
suffering from senile-dementia, stated (R. 13 8): 
ttThese individuals' behavior is changed and 
their personality. They lose some of the character-
istics that people knew them by, their sense of 
humor, some of their ways, although to some ex-
tent they tend to exaggerate their pre-existing 
personality. An individual who guarded his money 
might become extremely concerned about it. An 
individual that looked out for himself and didn't 
take anybody's advice might become very suspi-
cious of other people and feel that everyone was 
out to do him out of something." 
The doctor said he had considerable difficulty in discus-
sing his findings with Mrs. Demiris. He said Mrs. Demiris 
was in a state of severe and constant emotional tension, 
was quite distraught and that the doctor had great diffi-
culty in communicating any of the facts ·COncerning her 
husband's condition to her or trying to explain to her what 
they meant (R. 140). Additional tests were made on 
December 19th which indicated there was no tumor or 
~ growth. In the letter to Dr. Diumenti, dated December 
:~r 20, 1956, Exhibit D-9, following the examination of De-
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cember 18th, Dr. Powell, in reviewing the matter, stated 
in part as follows: 
uon examination Mr. Demiris shows a slow 
cerebration and ready confusion of a senile person, 
although his speech and his initial responses seem 
appropriate enough. He is neurologically negative 
except for this change. 
Dr. Powell sent a supplementary note December 22, 1956, 
in which he stated as follows: 
uMr. James Demiris 
Mr. Demiris was rechecked at home December 
21. Since the 18th he had become increasingly con-
fused and refused to take any food or fluid or medi-
cations. There was no change on examination ex-
cept for complete confusion and total disorienta-
tion. It was impossible to communicate with him or 
to obtain any type of cooperation. 
It is evident the deterioration is progressing 
very rapidly. The patient will clearly require in-
stitutional care and constant attention. 
His wife presents an additional problem since 
she is intensely neurotic herself and has both lan-
guage and intellectual deficits which make it im-
possible to communicate any understanding of his 
condition to her. Hospitalization in a closed ward 
is recommended and pneumoencephalogram 
would be a wise precaution to rule out a frontal 
hematoma or other mass lesion despite the negative 
EEG. Then some means of permanent institutionali-
zation will have to be arranged for." 
On voir dire, Dr. Powell admitted that if he had ob-
tained a history of the circumstances connected with the 
transaction with Mr. Long at the bank and the conversa-
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tions with the other witnesses, that all of these facts, if 
reliable would certainly alter his opinion (R. 148-149). 
On cross-examination Dr. Powell said it was not unusual 
for people 74 years of age to exhibit some of the symptoms 
he described and still be competent to carry on ordinary 
activities; that these symptoms may come on gradually 
and while the patient may have some of these symptoms 
he is still able to engage in normal activities; that in either 
senile changes or cerebral vascular diseases it is possible for 
changes to occur quite rapidly, over night, and that in 
fact the doctor had noticed a very rapid deterioration in 
Mr. Demiris from December 18th to the 21st (R. 15 5). 
Dr. Powell acknowledged that the best evidence con-
cerning the competency of Mr. Demiris and the rate of 
deterioration would lie in observations of his mental and 
physical activities by others in a period in which the dete-
rioration occurred; and this does not necessarily require 
medical observation but could be observation by those 
living with him or associating with him and those with 
whom he did business (R. 155-156). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT 
THE DECEASED, JAMES C. DEMIRIS WAS COM-
PETENT TO MAKE GIFTS AND TRANSFERS IN 
CONTEMPLA TIO,N OF DEATH ON DECEMBER 5, 
1956, AND DECEMBER 10, 1956, IS FULLY SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT EXERCISE UNDUE 
INFLUENCE OR DOMINATE HER HUSBAND IN 
THE CREATION OF THE JOINT BANK AC-
COUNTS IN DECEMBER OF 1956. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE MONEY IN 
THE BANK ACCOUNTS AND THE U.S. SAVINGS 
BONDS WAS SUPPORTED BY THE DOCUMENTS 
AND OTHER EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE 
CAUSE. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO REBUT THE 
PRESUMPTION OF JOINT TENANCY CREATED 
BY THE AGREEMENTS OF THE PARTIES IN ES-
TABLISHING THE JOINT SAVINGS ACCOUNTS. 
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POINT V 
THE TWO DEPOSIT CARDS IN THE CONTI-
NENTAL BANK CREATED A JOINT TENANCY 
AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT· 
POINT VI 
THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT 
THE WITHDRAWALS BY THE DEFENDANT DUR-
ING THE LIFETIME OF THE DECEDENT DID NOT 
TERMINATE THE JOINT TENANCY IS SUP-
PORTED BY BOTH THE FACTS AND THE LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT 
THE DECEASED, JAMES C. DEMIRIS WAS COM-
PETENT TO MAKE GIFTS AND TRANSFERS IN 
CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH ON DECEMBER 5, 
1956, AND DECEMBER 10, 1956, IS FULLY SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The test of mental capacity in ·Cases of transfers in 
contemplation of death is the same test applied in de-
termining testamentary capacity. Burgess vs. COlby 93 
Utah 103, 71 P.2d 185, stated the test to be as stated in 
In Re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 52 P.2d 1103, as 
follows: 
((The true test is as to whether the testatrix 
had (sufficient mind and memory (at the time of 
making the Will) to remember who were the 
natural objects of her bounty, recall to mind her 
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property, and dispose of it understandingly ac-
cording to some plan formed in her mind'." 
In an equity review of facts, if the records shows a 
fair preponderance, or even if the evidence is balanced 
evenly, the trial court's :findings should be sustained. 
Randall vs. Tracy-Collins Trust Company 6 Utah 2d 18, 
305 P.2d 480. 
In applying the foregoing test of mental capacity 
to the instant case we review :first the evidence presented 
by the plaintiff relative thereto. The lay witnesses of the 
Plaintiff who testified ·Concerning mental capacity, were 
John Demiris, Peter Demiris and Olympia Demiris, his 
wife, and Mrs. Milligan, who collected rent at the Oak-
wood apartments. John Demiris testified that in Septem-
ber, 1956, Jim didn't remember some names, and if some-
one asked him how he was getting along he would reply 
ni am all right, I got plenty of money" (R 253-254}; 
that John would see Jim downtown walking on the street 
about every day (R. 255}, and the next incident he 
remembered was on November 9, 1956, when John saw 
Jim on main street at the stock exchange, where Jim used 
to go often, and John suggested they send $30.00 to a 
sick sister in Greece, whereupon they went to the Conti-
nental Bank, made out a check and went to the Post 
Office. John asked Jim to write a few words to the 
sister and when Jim said he didn't know what to write 
her, John suggested a few words, whereupon James 
wrote a short note which they both signed and mailed 
with the check (R. 256-257}. Although John saw Jim 
almost every day in November, John could not remem-
ber any other incidents in November except that on No-
vember 26th he met Jim down town and Jim complained 
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that he was tired and his feet were bothering him; that 
Jim looked at his watch and said he had a date with the 
woman he married, whereupon John urged Jim, against 
his will, to go up to the office of Dr. Walker to get an 
appointment to see why Jim was losing his memory (R. 
258). It is to be noted that Novem.ber 26, 1956, was a 
Monday, and according to the testimony of Helen De-
miris they first found out about the will on Sunday, 
November 25th, (R. 410), and that she told her father 
the following day (R. 411). It may be just coincidence 
that John would see his brother downtown every day in 
November and would note an unusual circumstance in 
connection with his memory on November 26th, the day 
he found out about Jim's will. The next time John saw 
Jim was at Jim's apartment November 27th, at which 
time John told the defendant she should take Jim to a 
doctor as soon as possible because he doesn't remember; 
that on this same day John didn't remember talking very 
much to Jim, but Jim tried on John's shoes but found 
them no better than his own (R. 261). The next day 
mentioned by John was November 29th when John 
visited at the apartment and Jim said he couldn't see 
any better with the glasses (R. 261). Jim wouldn't talk 
very much with John on this day, November 29th (R. 
262). On December 1st, John, with a nephew and a 
niece, Helen Demiris, took Jim and the defendant to see 
Dr. Howard, Helen's doctor; but John did not notice 
anything unusual on that day. (R. 263). On December 
2nd, John and a nephew took Jim and the defendant for 
a ride out towards Murray where Jim was supposed to 
have said that he had never seen Murray before, (R. 263), 
and after the drive they went to Peter's house where Jim 
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had some coffee but said he didn't want any milk; that 
at Peter's house Jim seemed very restless and nervous, 
kept looking at his watch and wanted to leave and was 
taken home (R. 265). On December 3rd, John saw Jim 
and defendant downtown where John again urged that 
Jim must be taken to a doctor, but he reported nothing 
else as a result of this meeting (R. 265). On December 
4th John went to Jim's apartment for a visit but Jim 
would not talk to him very much (R. 266). On December 
5th or 6th, John went to the apartment but was told that 
Jim and the defendant were downtown so he waited 
until their return, but Jim wouldn't talk to him (R. 266). 
On December 14th, John and a nephew drove Jim and 
the defendant out to see Dr. Diumenti, and on the way to 
Bountiful Jim said he had never seen the Standard Oil 
Company before and as he rode along he was reading the 
signs but never said a word (R. 268-269). 
It is submitted that the foregoing summary of the 
testimony of John Demiris, if believed, only indicates 
isolated instances of forgetfulness on November 9th and 
November 26th, and indicates that after John tried to 
take Jim to the doctor on November 26th that thereafter 
Jim was reluctant to talk with John. 
Peter Demiris testified that in September Jim couldn't 
remember some old railroad acquaintances (R. 196), 
then on December 2nd, the day John, Pete, James, defend-
ant Virginia and a nephew went for a ride through Murray 
to Midvale, Pete asked Jim when they reached Murray if 
he knew what town it was and Jim said ccNo"; and that 
Jim wouldn't talk very much with them the rest of that 
day (R. 197-198). 
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Olympia Demiris testified that she saw Jim on Oc-
tober 26th on his name day at his home, and the only 
words she heard him say the whole evening was ((No" 
(R. 234) ; then in the middle of November she saw Jim 
on the corner of Anderson Jewelry Company and she 
stopped and asked him what he was doing there and he 
said he was waiting for someone, and when she suggested 
whether it was his wife he was waiting for, he replied, 
HI think so." The next time she observed him was Decem-
ber 2nd at her home, and when Jim called Peter ((The 
Countryman" and John stated, ttthis is your brother" 
Olympia said that Jim ((He just laugh all the time. He 
laughed." (R. 238). On cross-examination Olympia said 
she didn't know whether Jim recognized her on the street 
during the middle of November, and that she herself was 
in too big a hurry to talk to him very much ( R. 2 3 9) . 
She stated that Jim did not come to her place during the 
month of November, although when she called them to 
come for dinner on Thanksgiving Day he answered the 
phone and after saying hello, did not talk any more with 
her and just called his wife to the phone (R. 240) . 
Mrs. Milligan who collected rents at Oakwood apart-
ment said she had a dispute with Jim over a rental pay-
ment in September or October of 1956, and that there-
after Jim would walk by her without even recognizing 
her (R. 244) , and in response to a question by the Court, 
she acknowledged that Jim may have been ignoring her 
because of the rental incident (R. 245) . 
The medical testimony of the plaintiffs' was given by 
Dr. Howard and Dr. Powell. Dr. Howard said he ex-
amined Jim on December 1st, and obtained ua history in 
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an odd sort of way," but in the confusion ((couldn't make 
head or tail of why he was there," but did remember 
some complaint of leg pains resulting from the long walks 
(R. 164). Dr. Howard said that Jim was rather dull 
mentally, but when asked by the Court if this could be 
due to lack of understanding of English, the doctor said 
uNo, Mr. Demiris communicated in the English language 
very adequately." (R. 166). It is submitted that since 
this was the first time Dr. Howard had ever seen James 
Demiris, for him to conclude the man was dull mentally 
and not responsive and yet to determine at the ~arne time 
that he could communicate in the English language very 
adequately, seems to be inconsistent. The doctor testified 
that he made a superficial physical examination and found 
nothing abnormal, and made no investigation or exami-
nation of his mental capacity (R. 165). The doctor ad-
mitted on cross-examination that though he noted forget-
fulness in his file and concluded that it was probably 
secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis, he did not prescribe 
any treatment, did not suggest that Mr. Demiris return 
at a later date, and did not refer him to any one else for 
treatment (R. 166). That Mr. Demiris appeared to him 
to be rational (R. 166) . 
The testimony of Dr. Powell has been given in length 
both in the appellants' brief and in the Statement of Facts 
herein (supra p. 17). Dr. Powell saw the decedent on 
December 18th, and could only speculate as to his con-
dition prior to that time. Doctor noted that between the 
18th and the 21st of December Jim's condition progressed 
very rapidly, and the entire condition could have oc-
curred within a period of a few days (R. 15 5) . The 
doctor admitted that the best evidence as to when the de-
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terioration occurred would be the observation of persons 
during the period of deterioration. (R. 15 6). This obser-
vation could be by those living with him, or closely associ-
ated with him and those with whom he did business (R. 
156). The doctor stated that if he had known about the 
transaction with Mr. Long on December lOth and some 
of the visits with other persons between December 1st 
and 15th (R. 148) that these facts would alter his opinion 
(R. 149). The doctor stated that persons suffering from 
this senile type of deterioration tend to exaggerate their 
pre-existing personality, and that a individual who guarded 
his money might become extremely concerned about it, 
and an individual that looked out for himself and didn't 
take anybody's advice might become very suspicious of 
other people and feel that everyone was out to do him out 
of something (R. 13 8) . 
From all of the foregoing evidence submitted by 
the plaintiffs, none of the testimony of the lay witnesses 
indicated that on December 5th and December lOth, 1956, 
James Demiris could not recall the natural objects of his 
bounty and recall to mind his property and dispose of it 
understandingly according to some plan formed in his 
mind. The medical testimony of Dr. Howard indicated 
that he had no serious concern for the condition of Mr. 
Demiris in that he deemed him rational, prescribed noth-
ing, and made no referral. Dr. Powell while indicating 
there could have been some symptoms of deterioration 
existing from one to four months prior to December 18th, 
1956, admitted that it is entirely possible that the de-
terioration could be very rapid; that the deterioration in 
fact was very rapid between December 18 and December 
21, 1956; that the best evidence of his condition prior 
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thereto would be from persons who observed him, and 
that a person could have some symptoms of the senile 
disease and still be able to engage in normal activities (R. 
154). 
The defendant presented several witnesses who had 
observed James Demiris between November 28th and 
December 15, 1956. Dr. Callaghan, an eye, ear, nose and 
throat spe.cialist testified that during an eye examination 
on November 28, 1956, which required a total of one and 
a quarter hours, during which time the doctor spent at 
least 25 minutes in question and answer, trial of lenses, 
etc., and he found Jim to be very responsive and normal. 
Mr. Floyd R. Long, a bank clerk at First Security 
Bank who had known James Demiris over the past ten 
years, and saw him at least twice a month, said that on 
December 1Oth James Demiris gave him instructions 
relative to putting his wife's name on the remittance from 
Elmer Butler because he would like her to be able to cash 
the check in case he was sick or something, she could 
cash it and have some money (R. 323). That the first 
approach was made by Mr. Demiris and he gave all of the 
instructions before any conversation took place between 
Mr. Demiris and his wife; that a memorandum, Exhibit 
D-20, was prepared by Long and was read by James 
Demiris and signed by James Demiris and his wife; that 
during the entire transaction, which took 20 or 30 minutes, 
Mr. Long noticed nothing unusual in any respect about 
the en tire transaction, his appearance, or in any other 
manner (R. 325). 
Mr. Kirkham, an insurance salesman, who had known 
James Demiris since 1922, said he saw Mr. and Mrs. De-
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miris on 4th South on December lOth or 12th and stopped 
to pass the time of day with them for :five or ten minutes, 
and had an occasion to observe them both. He noticed 
nothing different in any way from his previous meeting 
with Jim (R. 3 3 3). There was nothing unusual about his 
responses, and in fact Mr. Kirkham was later very much 
surprised to learn of his death. (R. 3 34). 
Mrs. Bombas, who had been a friend of Mr. and Mrs. 
James Demiris for about eight years and had visited with 
both of them about twice a month over that period of 
time, both in her home and in their home, stated that she 
had visited with Mr. and Mrs. Demiris at her home on 
December 4th or 5th, on which occasion they stayed three 
or four hours and conversed generally about many subjects 
using the Greek language, and she noticed nothing un-
usual about Mr. Demiris on that occasion (R. 339); that 
on December 11th or 12th, Mrs. Bomb as and her husband 
visited Mr. and Mrs. Demiris at the Demiris apartment for 
about two hours, and they talked about making Christmas 
cookies and about other matters; that Mr. Demiris par-
ticipated in the conversation in the Greek language with 
Mrs. Bombas and her husband and during this entire visit 
she noticed nothing unusual (R. 3 3 8) . 
Mrs. Ann Tiano saw Jim about three times between 
December 1st and the 13th, and on the 13th of December 
she talked briefly with Jim about her trip to California 
and noticed nothing unusual about his conversation at 
that time (R. 346). 
Mrs. O'Connell had lived at the Oakwood apartments 
several years and visited with Mr. and Mrs. Demiris almost 
daily throughout that period. She said she had conversa-
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tions almost daily with Mr. Demiris during the month of 
December before he went to the hospital. She stated that 
he appeared to her to be sick a couple or three weeks be-
fore he went to the hospital, and that he complained of his 
feet and his eyes (R. 3 52). That towards the last, although 
he appeared to be sick, he always recognized her (R. 352). 
That she didn't notice anything different about him when 
she talked to him, except that he looked ill (R. 3 54) . 
Mrs. Tsimpoukis who had been very close friends with 
Mr. and Mrs. James Demiris since 1926, and who had 
visited with them several times a week over the period of 
their association, remembered a specific visit on the Friday 
night, December 7th, while she was house cleaning, when 
Mr. and Mrs. Demiris came together for a visit and stayed 
for about 45 minutes. They appeared very happy and 
stated that he had gone to the bank and changed the 
books. They talked at length and she noticed nothing un-
usual about Mr. Demiris on this date of December 7th. 
(R. 358). She visited again with them at her home on 
December 12th or 13th when they stayed about two hours, 
had refreshments and talked about a number of subjects; 
and she noticed nothing unusual about Mr. Demiris, except 
that he stated that he would like to leave after about two 
hours visit because he was tired (R. 359). 
Dr. Diumenti gave James Demiris a general physical 
examination on December 14th and while his findings were 
negative, yet because he had received a complaint of for-
getfulness, he referred James to Dr. Powell, a specialist, 
to rule out any possibilities of brain tumor, etc. He said 
that James was responsive and did not give any bad ans-
wers (R. 284), and he recalled specifically asking James 
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if he had finances available to take care of additional 
medical expenses, and James told him that he was financial-
ly able to take care of himself (R. 286). The doctor said he 
was greatly surprised and impressed with the very severe 
deterioration which he noted between the time he first 
saw Mr. Demiris on December 14th and when he next 
saw him one or two days after his admission to the hos-
pital (R. 290). 
From the foregoing review of the evidence it clearly 
appears that the decedent James Demiris on December 
5th, 1956, at the time the remainder of the savings. ac-
counts were made into joint tenancy, and on December 
1Oth when he designated his wife a joint payee of the 
Elmer Butler note, had full testamentary capacity. 
In the case of Burgess vs. Colby, supra, there was a suit 
by some of the children of Joseph Colby to cancel a deed to 
real property and an assignment of water stock executed 
by Joseph Colby to his wife nine days before his death, on 
the grounds of mental incapacity. The jury returned a 
verdict that he did not have mental capacity, but on 
appeal, this Court reversed the judgment. The Supreme 
Court held that though Colby was 78 years old, became 
ill, grew progressively worse, and for the last day or two 
prior to his death was unconscious, and though in his 
early sickness he was disturbed in mind about his property, 
and several times mentioned that he wanted it fixed 
proper; and on the day the instruments were signed, the 
officer of the bank was unable to get Mr. Colby to sit up 
or be conscious enough to sign, but later in the evening 
the deeds had been signed, and though Mr. Colby at the 
time of signing did not appear to be any different except 
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that he was sick, this Court found and concluded that the 
decedent was competent although he was a sick man, 
and getting weaker day by day, having difficulty with 
speech on account of having lost his teeth, and rambled 
from one subject to another. 
In Re Chongas Estate, 115 Utah 95, 202 P.2d 711, 
where the decedent had been committed to the mental 
hospital and subsequently released, changed his will, and 
later died in the mental hospital after being recommitted, 
he was found to have had testamentary capacity, even 
though he was described by witnesses as being jumpy, not 
coherent, not all there, had no mind at all, and was crazy 
as a bed bug. 
In final analysis the most that the plaintiff can 
claim for any of its witnesses is that on a few isolated oc-
casions James Demiris seemed forgetful and refused to 
talk with his brothers, John and Pete, and his sister-in-
law, Olympia. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND 
THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT EXERCISE 
UNDUE INFLUENCE OR DOMINATE HER HUS-
BAND IN THE CREATION OF THE JOINT BANK 
ACCOUNTS IN DECEMBER OF 1956. 
The Appellants admit at the outset that the only evi-
dence of undue influence in this case must be taken from 
inferences drawn from the facts and circumstances, and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
the facts and circumstances discussed by appellants fall 
into three general categories: 
( 1) Jim had a generous attitude towards his brothers 
and sister, and would not have failed to provide for them; 
(2) Jim disliked his wife; and (3) that Jim's wife took 
advantage of her superior position in a confidential rela-
tionship. 
Considering first the attitude Jim had towards his 
brothers and sister, the appellants failed to mention the 
will Jim made on December 30, 1947, (D-7, R. 392). In 
this will of December 30, 1947, Jim left $1,000.00 each 
to his two brothers and one sister in Greece, and left noth-
ing at all for his brothers John and Peter in Salt Lake City, 
and left the entire rest, residue and remainder to his be-
loved wife. By December 30, 1947, Jim had already 
accumulated his fortune. The appellants dwell at length 
on the long lifetime association between Jim and his 
brothers Peter and John, starting in 1907 in working here 
together in America, and yet after this long association 
with his brothers, Jim on December 30, 1947, made a will 
in which he left nothing for John or Peter Demiris. This 
should be a complete answer to the claim that John and 
Peter Demiris were the natural objects of the bounty of 
Jim Demiris. As to Jim's generosity towards his sick 
sister in Greece, John testified that on November 9, 1956, 
John suggested to Jim that they send some money to their 
sick sister, whereupon together they sent her about $30.00 
and for about seven months prior thereto they had been 
sending her only about $15.00 per month (R. 256). On 
cross-examination John was asked if Jim owed him any 
money at the time of his death, to which John replied that 
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between 1910 and 1914 he had given Jim $700.00 or 
$750.00, and then gave him another $250.00, but later 
when he asked Jim about it, Jim said he couldn't remember 
any such deal and wouldn't pay John (R. 309-310). 
Peter Demiris, after testifying that he had worked off and 
on with his brother Jim, stated that when he worked as 
bartender for Jim at the Pacific Hotel, he would work 
16 hours a day for Jim but would only be paid for eight 
hours, though this was at a time when Jim was making 
most of his money (R. 192) ; but on cross-examination 
Peter said he was working by the month, not by the hour, 
and Jim never offered to pay him more and Peter never 
asked for more (R. 200). Peter further said that Jim 
didn't owe him any money, and he didn't expect anything 
from Jim (R. 201). 
The appellants point to the wills of March 19th and 
March 26, 1952, as being conclusive proof of the life-
time desires of James Demiris, with respect to his bounty. 
It is to be noted that these wills were executed at a time 
when Jim was contemplating a trip to Greece (R. 169) 
and he made the will of March 26, 1952, to make sure 
that in the event of a common disaster, the estate would 
not go to his wife's family (R. 170) , and further that he 
was afraid that with his wife's relatives named as bene-
ficiaries in the will, if he got over to Greece they would 
poison him (R. 174). Jim went to Greece with his wife 
in 1952, and stayed six months (R. 72). 
Next, considering Jim's attitude towards his wife, 
we note first the financial arrangements he made for her. 
As shown by Exhibit P-22, commencing in September, 
1943, and continuing through January 1947, Jim pur-
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chased about 83 separate United States Government 
Bonds in denominations of $100.00 and $500.00 in the 
names of Mr. James Demiris or Iphigenia Demiris, totaling 
about $10,400.00. Account number 94501 in the Conti-
nental National Bank and Trust Company, Exhibit P-12, 
was opened in the joint names of James Demiris or Iphi-
genia on February 23, 1950, with a deposit of $5,304.33, 
and many subsequent deposits thereafter increased the 
a.ccount to about $10,000.00 at the time of his death. 
Account No. 4159, State Savings and Loan Association, 
Exhibit P-15 shows an account opened December 12, 1949, 
in the name of James Demiris or Iphigenia Demiris, with 
an initial deposit of $750.00 in 1949, and subsequent de-
posits bringing the amount up to $10,000.00 in December, 
1956. Then of special significance is Account No. 22256 
with the First Security Bank of Utah, Exhibit P-10, 
which was started originally in 1952, in the name of James 
C. Demiris only, and when changed into joint account on 
March 12, 1956, was $4,743.78, and the balance in 
December of 1956 was $6,841.99. The account cards and 
statement sheets appear as exhibits in the file. 
Jim died at the age of 74, and his wife at the time of 
trial was 54 years old, which would make her about 22 
years younger than him. They were married in 19 2 5, in 
Athens, Greece (R. 70). She went back to Greece in 
1929 for one year to visit relatives and again in 1936 at 
which time her return was prevented by the outbreak 
of World War II, and she didn't return to the United 
States until 1946 (R. 46 and 123). While she was in 
Greece she corresponded with her husband regularly and 
he sent her about $5,000.00 for her living expenses, as 
well as having placed the United States Savings Bonds 
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in her name as set forth above. Mr. and Mrs. Demiris 
were together on most of their visits with friends and 
relatives. Mrs. Tsimpoukis who had known Jim and his 
wife since 1926, and who visited with them at least 
weekly, continuing up to the time of hospitalization of 
Jim, testified concerning the many visits together by Mr. 
and Mrs. Demiris at her place (R. 375). Mrs. Bombas who 
had known Mr. and Mrs. Demiris for about seven years 
before his death, told of several visits, both at her house 
and at Jim's apartment, with Mr. and Mrs. Demiris (R. 
340). Mrs. Olympia Demiris testified that Jim and his 
wife would come almost every Sunday to visit her (R. 
232), except that in the month of November, 1956, 
he did not visit her at all ( R. 2 3 9) . John Demiris testified 
that Jim began arguing with his wife a year or two after 
they got married, and the argument continued during the 
remainder of their married life; that the only nice thing 
he ever remembers Jim saying about his wife was uShe 
is economical, and she is pretty tight" (R. 303); he said 
that she was a good cook but that Jim didn't care much 
for eating, and was pretty hard to satisfy and nobody 
could satisfy him (R. 3 04). 
It is an easy matter to describe many married couples 
as ttalways quarrelling" and yet when analyzed their dif-
ferences can be singular rather than multiple. So far as 
the arguments at the Oakwood apartments are concerned, 
the tenants testified they heard voices in Greek (R. 242). 
On page 31 of the appellants' brief they cite several 
pages in the transcript to support their contention that 
the marriage was filled with quarrels. An analysis of all of 
these references indicates that the quarrels or discussions 
were relative to Jim's wife wanting him to go to Greece, 
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with the exception of John Demiris, who indicated some 
disputes were over money (R. 252), and Jim, being very 
frugal, would spend very little. In final analysis it boils 
down to a proposition that according to the witnesses 
for the appellant, if his wife continued to press him to re-
turn to Greece, he would divorce her rather than go 
with her to Greece. All of the testimony concerning quar-
rels about Greece referred to instances prior to November, 
1956. 
A very important change took place in the lives of 
James Demiris and his wife in late November, 1956. Jim, 
who had previously been in excellent health and walked 
miles and miles every day, for the first time, began to 
feel pain in his legs and was bothered in his eyesight. He 
had never been to a doctor, and then starting on November 
26, when he was taken for an appointment with Dr. 
Walker by his brother John, and on November 28th and 
30th when he was examined by Dr. Callaghan for his 
eyes, and on December 1st when he was given a examina-
tion by Dr. Howard, the combined effects of the pain in his 
legs and eyes, and visiting the two doctors within the 
space of about five days, started Jim to thinking about 
quickly settling his financial affairs. His wife went with 
him to the eye doctor on November 28th, and following 
the advice of Dr. Callaghan, she did not let Jim travel 
on the streets alone there~fter (R. 277) and (R. 79). 
Mrs. Demiris cancelled the appointment which John had 
made with Dr. Walker, because Jim was disturbed about 
this and didn't want to go to Dr. Walker but wanted to 
go to Dr. Diumenti (R. 80). Jim didn't want to go to 
Dr. Howard on December 1st, because he said he didn't 
want to pay $5.00 for no good reason (R. 82). Jim must 
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have become suspicious of Peter and John after Novem-
ber 26th, because he refused to talk with Peter and John 
thereafter, and yet conversed very normally with the 
people he wanted to talk with, such as Mrs. O'Connell, 
Mrs. Tsimpoukis, Mr. and Mrs. Bombas, Mr. Kirkham, 
Mr. Floyd Long, Mrs. Tiano and Mrs. Demas. His wife 
testified that Jim seldom wanted to visit his brothers 
and would only go after she quarreled with him to get 
him to go (R. 47); and this was supported by the testi-
mony of Mrs. Demas (R. 386). Under these circum-
stances, Jim awakened his wife at :five o'clock one morn-
ing on December 5th, 1956, and told her he would like 
to change the books to her name, and told her to get up 
and get dressed, because she took so long to dress, so that 
they could go downtown and change the books into her 
name (R. 179 and R. Ill). Jim gave her the savings 
books on December 5th, after changing them to her 
name, and told her that if something should happen to 
him and should he go to the hospital, and should the 
doctor say he is, going to die, that she should go and put 
the books in her name only (R. 179) . The books were 
given to her on December 5th when they returned home 
after the books were changed (R. 18 0) . Mr. Demiris, 
while he and defendant were visiting Mrs. Tsimpoukis on 
December 7th, 1956, told Mrs. Tsimpoukis that he went 
to the bank and changed the books (R. 3 58) . Jim also told 
Mrs. Demas while he was visiting with her alone the next 
day after he had changed the books: uMrs. Demas, I've 
drawn my books and the money to my wife." (R. 387). 
The next transaction wherein Jim transferred assets 
to his wife, was on December 10, 1956, when he went with 
his wife to the First Security Bank, Fourth South Branch, 
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and approached Mr. Floyd R. Long, the bank clerk, and 
before any conversation took place between Mr. and Mrs. 
Demiris, Jim spoke first to Mr. Long saying that he 
wanted to put his wife's name on the remittance, on his 
check that was mailed out to him, and that he would 
like her to be able to cash the check in case he was sick or 
something, she could cash it and have some money; he 
further asked what would have to be done to be able to 
put her name on it (R. 323) and said he wanted her to 
be able to cash it alone (R. 325). Mrs. Demiris did not 
speak with Mr. Long because he could not understand 
her (R. 324), and while Mr. and Mrs. Demiris talked to-
gether after Mr. Demir is had already told Mr. Long 
what he wanted, there was no conversation before Mr. 
Demiris had stated his desires (R. 330). Mr. Long then 
prepared Exhibit D-20, which he laid out on the counter 
and which was picked up by Mr. Demiris, who read it 
and did not hesitate in signing it (R. 325). Then in answer 
to questions put by the Court, Mr. Long said there was 
nothing unusual about the whole transaction (R. 3 31) . 
Mr. Long, as an employee in the Trust Department of First 
Security Bank, the plaintiff in this action, is at least an 
impartial witness so far as the defendant is concerned. 
He had seen Mr. Demiris about twice a month for the 
period of ten or twelve years and found him no different 
from usual on this occasion than on previous occasions, 
during a 20 to 30 minute conference relative to the pro-
ceeds of the Elmer Butler note. This transaction was five 
days after the transfers of savings bank accounts on 
December 5, 1956. 
From the foregoing review, it clearly appears that 
the facts and circumstances, and the inferences therefrom 
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indicate that Mr. Demiris was acting freely and of his own 
desire in the transactions of December 5th and lOth, 1956. 
We should now consider the effect, if any, the hus-
band and wife relationship which existed between Jim 
and the defendant has upon the question of undue in-
fluence. While generally speaking, a husband-wife rela-
tionship can be considered a confidential relationship, 
yet this should be distinguished from the relationship of 
confidential adviser. In this case the evidence was that 
Jim Demiris was a well educated business man who could 
read and write the English and Greek languages. There 
was no evidence that he at any time relied upon any 
advice or counsel from his wife. He was fully acquainted 
with the procedure of placing bonds and savings accounts 
in joint names the way he did between September, 1943, 
and March 12, 1956, as set forth supra. If Jim needed 
any further advice regarding joint accounts, he in fact 
obtained it from Alke Diamant when Jim told Alke he 
had several accounts in joint names with his wife, and Alke 
replied: ((Well, Jim, if you have a desire to leave anything 
to your brothers and sister, you have to be careful not to 
have all your accounts jointly." (R. 224). Jim also told 
Alke that he had two or three accounts in his own name, 
and that he was entitled to some money from the sale 
of the Oakwood apartments (R. 224). What further 
independent advice did Jim Demiris require? On the 
morning of December 5th, 1956, when he awakened his 
wife at five o'clock in the morning and said he remem-
bered something, he could well have remembered the ad-
vice given him by Alke Diamant to avoid the consequences 
of the will of March 26, 1952. He could clearly see now 
that his wife of 32 years, who was then about 52 years 
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old, was standing by him and staying with him in his 
illness as she had done over the years and provided for him 
even though he deprived her of all the luxuries of life, that 
she was the natural object of his bounty, and that his 
brothers, Pete and John, in their early seventies whom he 
didn't want to visit except when he casually met them on 
the street, were no more the objects of his bounty than 
they were on December 30, 1947, when he drew his first 
will and left everything to his wife, except $1,000.00 each 
to his two brothers and one sister in Greece. There was no 
evidence that his wife or anyone else could make Jim 
Demiris do what he didn't want to do. In statements to 
Mrs. Tsimpoukis on December 7th and to Mrs. Demas on 
about December 6th, that he had put the books in his 
wife's name, and his statement to Mr. Floyd R. Long that 
he wanted his wife to get the money from the Elmer 
Butler note, all of which conversations were normal and 
usual without hesitance, clearly show that Jim was act-
ing of his own desire at the time the transfers were made. 
It would be an anomaly in the law to hold that a wife, 
who understood very little, if anything, about business, 
who had never advised her husband in matters of business, 
and who had difficulty conversing in the English language, 
had a duty to advise her husband, who was well educated 
and qualified in business, that he should not transfer the 
balance of the account to her name without obtaining 
separate counsel and advice. 
The facts in this case are certainly different from the 
facts in the cases cited by the appellants. In Re Swan's 
Estate 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P. 2d 682, an attorney and a 
self-imposed friend drew a codicil to a will for a lady of 
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subnormal intelligence who had been relying upon their 
advice, and in which codicil the attorney and friend were 
to receive substantially all of the estate with only a small 
portion going to the sister and sole heir of the testatrix. 
In the .case of Miller vs. Livingstone, 3 1 Utah 415, 
88 P. 338, the Supreme Court did not decide whether 
the evidence showed undue influence. In that case ~he 
facts showed that the testator had five children by a pre-
vious marriage. His second wife dictated the terms of a 
will to a banker, stating to the banker that the testator 
would have to sign the will and that she wouldn't have it 
any other way. Then the second wife having died without 
the will having been probated, the contest developed 
between the heirs of the second wife and the children of 
the husband and these facts, the court said, could raise a 
suspicion requiring the vigilance of the court. 
In Re Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P. 2d 602, 
where the decedent was held not to have been acting 
under undue influence in making a will disinheriting his 
sister and giving his estate to a Catholic School by a will 
which he made at the hospital following an operation 
for cancer of the stomach from which he died; and al-
though he had never before met the Priest who was at 
his side and whom he requested to get assistance in pre-
paring a will, he told the attorney who came to draw the 
will that he desired to leave his property to the Catholic 
School of which the Priest was supervisor, this Court 
under comments 16 and 17, said that the most that can be 
said about the influence asserted by Father Kennedy was 
that during the few minutes he was alone with the testator, 
he, notwithstanding his testimony to the contrary, may 
have suggested a disposition of the testator's property to 
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the school over which he ,presided. The Court then stated 
that undue influence must be proved and will not be pre-
sumed from mere interest or opportunity; and the oppor-
tunity to exercise influence, unless combined wirh 
circumstances tending to show its exercise, affords no 
presumption that it was in fact exercised. 
The case of Jardine vs. Archibald, 3 Utah 2d 8 8, 279 
P. 2d 454, was a suit by some of the decedent's children 
to set aside transfers of property made by an 8 0 year 
old woman to her two younger children, who saw her 
more often than the other children. The Supreme Court 
upheld the finding of the Trial Court that the transfers 
were free from fraud and undue influence, even though 
the decedent had been suffering from high blood pressure, 
hardening of the arteries, headaches, being forgetful at 
times and even eccentric, and whereas she made these 
transfers at 80 years of age, while prior thereto she care-
fully avoided making any substantial gifts to anyone. 
This Court held that because the Trial Court found as a 
matter of fact that the children held a confidential rela-
tionship to the decedent, the transaction would have to 
be scrutinized; but even so, there was no undue influence 
where the recipients of her bounty took her to a Notary 
Public to consummate the transfers. 
In Re Lavelle's Estate, 122 Utah 253, 248 P. 2d 372, 
where the trial court found that there was undue influence 
by a male nurse and masseur who visited and treated the 
partially paralyzed testatrix almost daily, and a 50 year 
old carpenter who was her boy friend, although she was 
almost 60, and where the testatrix made her third will 
leaving one-half of her estate to her boy friend and the 
other half to the masseur and made no provisions for her 
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half-sister who was the beneficiary under previous wills; 
this Court reversed the findings of undue influence, on 
appeal, stating that undue influence must be proved and 
will not be presumed from mere interest or opportunity 
and stating that the most that was proved was that the 
masseur ((dominated her affairs and overcame her will" 
which amounted to no more than mere opportunity col-
ored by respondents' hopeful suspicions. This Court 
further said that this was not an unnatural disposition. 
The Court under comment (12) stated that: 
((Due allowance is made for Mrs. Lavelle's age 
and poor physical condition so that her mind 
may have been more susceptible to guileful impor-
tunings than it otherwise would have been. We 
agree that the amount of influence necessary to 
overcome the will of the testator varies. . . . But 
Mrs. Lavelle was certainly not possessed of a 
((child's mind" as was the victim in the Hanson 
case. In fact, the testimony shows that she was 
wilful even to the point of being cantankerous 
with those about her. This and the fact of her 
refusal to go to the hospital and the rest home 
except upon the use of cajolery and stratagem 
demonstrates that she was not as susceptible of 
having her will overcome by the influence of others 
as respondents suggest." 
There was no evidence that James Demiris during his 
last illness would cooperate in any matter which was con-
trary to his desire. 
It is respectfully submitted that Mrs. Demiris was 
not a confidential adviser to the decedent; that the deced-
ent was capable of relying, and did rely upon his own 
judgment and decision; and that each of the transactions, 
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of necessity, were done in the presence of third persons 
at the respective banks by employees of the banks who 
presented the proper cards for signature and made the 
transfers on the books and accounts; and in the case of 
Mr. Long a document was prepared by Mr. Long carry-
ing out the stated desires of the decedent himself. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE MONEY 
IN THE BANK ACCOUNTS AND THE U.S. SAV-
INGS BONDS WAS SUPPORTED BY THE DOCU-
MENTS AND OTHER EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN 
THE CAUSE. 
All of the money in the savings accounts were evi-
denced by written agreements signed by James Demiris 
and Iphigenia Demiris, except the trust account in the 
American Savings and Loan Association, which will be 
dealt with in the cross-appeal, Point I. 
The case of Holt vs. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 P. 2d 
715, was the first Utah case to construe joint deposits 
where both parties sign joint deposit contracts. The doc-
trine of the Holt vs. Bayles case is that where there is a 
joint agreement executed by the parties which clearly 
declares the intention to create a joint interest of each in 
the deposit or credit, the court will sustain such intention 
thus expressed. Anna Bayles deposited $12,000.00 of her 
own money in a joint account with her niece, Emma J. 
Bayles. Upon the death of Anna, other nieces of Anna, 
claiming under her will, bring suit, de.claring the money to 
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belong to the estate of Anna. The Court said the original 
ownership of the money or possession of the pass book is 
not important, and that where a savings bank deposit is 
in joint names and the intent appears to create a joint 
tenancy, the survivor takes title to the entire fund irre-
spective of whether he ever had any possession of the pass 
book, or whether the money deposited belonged to the 
other; that where both parties went to the bank, deposited 
the check and signed a joint deposit contract, the parties 
purchased from the bank a credit payable to either of the 
joint depositors or to the survivor and each of them had a 
present interest in the credit. The Court quoted from 3 8 
Harvard Law Review 244, to the effect that the proper 
theory is that when A deposits his money in a joint account 
where the depositary promises to pay A or B as joint obli-
gees, and where both A and B sign the agreement of 
deposit with the bank, it is clear that the bank makes a 
direct promise to B and undertakes an obligation to B 
equivalent to that undertaken to A, and in this respect 
the transaction becomes, not one of legal gift from A to 
B, but the purchase by A for A and B of a contract right 
against the bank. The Court distinguishes this case from 
all of the previous cases on the ground that there was no 
written agreement signed by both of the parties in the 
previOus cases. 
In brief, the cases decided before Holt vs. Bayles and 
cited by the appellant are summarized as follows. 
In the case of Holman vs. Deseret Savings Bank, 41 
Utah 340, 124 P. 765, the decedent, a married woman, 
first had a deposit in the bank in the name of herself and 
Eva Z. Dean; when Mrs. Dean died, the decedent presented 
the passbook to the cashier of the bank to have the account 
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transferred to herself and Mrs. Holman and the entry was 
made in the passbook ccin account with Carrie L. Eslinger 
or Helen M. Holman." The court held that there was no 
evidence of a gift here, and the deposit was not in such 
form as to constitute the parties as joint owners. Mrs. 
Holman was not a relative of the decedent. 
Boyle vs. Dinsdale, 45 Utah 112, 143 P. 136, was a 
case in which a mother having eight children, ranging in 
ages from 29 to 52, deposited a sum of money in the bank 
in her own name and then later went with her two young-
est children to the bank to make a further deposit and 
asked the cashier to fix the deposits in such a way that if 
she died her two younger .children could get the money, 
but that she wanted to retain the interest during her life-
tim~, whereupon the cashier made the passbook ((Payable 
to George T. Pierce or Caroline P. Dinsdale, an equal 
amount to each," and then on the bank ledger he made the 
entry to read ((Payable to self or George T. Pierce or 
Caroline P. Dinsdale, an equal amount to each." The 
Court said in this case the mother had created an oral 
trust of the account and merely reserved the interest 
during her lifetime, and that upon her death the money 
was payable to the two children, in equal shares. 
In the case of Olson vs. Scott, 61 Utah 42, 210 P. 987, 
Ellen Olson, a widow who had five children, transferred 
her savings account to the credit of Ellen Olson and 
Olive M. Scott, or to the survivor of either of them. Upon 
the death of Ellen, another daughter as administrator 
brings suit to recover the money. The trial court found 
a gift from Ellen to Olive, and was affirmed by this Court 
on appeal in an opinion which distinguished this case from 
the Holman case in that in the Holman case, the joint 
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depositor was not a relative and there were no words of 
survivorship in the entry. 
The cases of Lovett vs. Continental Bank, 4 Utah 2d 
76, 286 P. 2d 1065, and Jones vs. Cook, 118 Utah 562, 
223 P. 2d 423, cited by the appellants deal with the 
question of gifts of personal property, being jewelry, and 
an automobile, respectively, and are not applicable. 
The cases subsequent to Holt vs. Bayles, are: 
Neill vs. Royce, 101 Utah 181, 120 P. 2d 327, where 
the first wife of Mr. Royce sought one-half of the funds 
held by Mr. Royce and his second wife in a joint account 
to satisfy support money due the first wife from Mr. 
Royce. The second wife claimed that all the money de-
posited in the account was her own, even though they 
had signed a joint tenancy agreement with the bank. The 
trial court found that Mr. Royce had an interest in the 
savings account and this was affirmed on appeal. This 
Court said that the conclusive principal in Holt vs. Bay-
les, while not controlling in this case, nevertheless there 
remains a presumption of joint tenancy where both co-
tenants are alive, and this presumption, injected by courts 
of equity since ancient time, continues and can be over-
come only by clear and convincing proof to the contrary. 
In the case of Greener vs. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 
212 P. 2d 194, Mr. Greener at age 79 years, married Mrs. 
Greener who was 65 years old. Both parties had raised 
families and had been widowed. After they had been 
married less than three months, she commenced suit for 
divorce, but they were reconciled three months later. 
Nine months after that she went to California to visit her 
children and while she was away, Mr. Greener withdrew 
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from various savings banks the funds which theretofore 
existed in the joint names of himself and his wife, and 
made a gift to his son. Upon her return from California 
Mrs. Greener brought suit for divorce and to claim an 
interest in the joint account. The trial court found that 
under the circumstances of this case, there was clear and 
convincing proof that the intent of the parties was differ-
ent from that expressed in their joint agreements, and 
accordingly found that Mrs. Greener had no interest 
in the accounts, for reasons stated in a detailed memo-
randum of decision. This Court in affirming the trial 
court stated that there being a conflict in the evidence as 
to the circumstances surrounding the making of the 
agreement, the Supreme Court would rely on the trial 
judge to resolve the conflicts. This Court, after stating that 
in absence of an agreement, and the only documentary 
evidence being the form of deposit, A or B, with no 
provisions concerning survivorship, the intent of the 
owner in converting the account to a joint one must be 
shown by extrinsic evidence. But the Court goes on to say: 
(( ( 11) Where, however, the parties have en-
tered into and expressed in writing a complete 
agreement which is clear as to the intent and pur-
pose of the deposit, the intent so expressed will be 
given effect unless the instrument is successfully 
attacked for fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other 
infirmity, or unless it is shown by ((clear and con-
vincing proof" that the parties intended the instru-
ment to have a different effect from that expressed. 
Neill vs. Royce, 101 Utah 181, 120 P. 2d 327. 
And where one of the co-depositors had died prior 
to the assertion of conflicting rights it has bee11 
held that there is a conclusive presumption that 
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such integrated agreement sets out the complete 
intent of the parties. Holt vs. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 
39 P. 2d 715. The reason for the conclusive pre-
sumption, in the absence of statute, may not be 
clear for seemingly death would have no effect on 
the intent with which the joint deposit was created. 
However, since both of the parties in the instant 
case are still alive, we need not concern ourselves 
with the reasoning employed to support the con-
clusive presumption of intent where one of the 
parties has died before the assertion of conflicting 
rights." (Emphasis added) . 
In the case of First Security Bank of Utah vs. Burgi, 
122 Utah 445, 251 P. 2d 297, where a father had an ac-
count in the bank in the name of ((Burgi Grocery and Meat, 
Fred Burgi." and later signed the card with his son, Clyde, 
authorizing the bank to treat them as joint depositors but 
which card did not change or mention the name of the 
account to be so treated, this Court held that there was 
no joint acount because of the failure to designate an 
account, but reaffirmed the holding of Holt vs. Bayles. 
This Court held in comment seven and eight as follows: 
tt (7 & 8) It is true where an intention to 
create a joint account is clearly expressed in a writ-
ten contract executed by the parties, which re-
mains unaltered, and there is no evidence of fraud, 
undue influence, mistake, or other infirmity, the 
question of intention ceases to be in issue and the 
courts are bound by the agreement. Holt vs. Bayles, 
85 Utah 364, 39 P. 2d 715, and cases cited therein. 
Likewise it is true that the fact that all the funds 
are contributed by one of the parties will not pre-
vent the creation of a joint tenancy in the account 
if all the essentials for the creation of such an es-
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tate exist. Holt vs. Bayles, supra; 48 C. J. S. Joint 
Tenancy, 3 (e) ( 4), page 925." 
The appellants on page 52 and 53 of their brief cite 
Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380, 167 N.E. 506, and 
imply that the holding of this case would preclude survi-
vorship as to all funds withdrawn during the lifetime of 
of the owner. However, both the appellants and the 
quoted citation in A.L.R. misinterpret the holding of 
Moskowitz v. Marrow. Chief Justice Cardozo who wrote 
a concuring opinion in the case of Moskowitz v. Marrow, 
wrote the opinion in a sequel case, Marrow v. Moskowitz, 
et al., 255 N.Y. 219, 174 N.E. 460, and ~tated that since 
there was some confusion as to the effect of the ruling in 
the case of Moskowitz v. Marrow, he would state it again 
in this case of Marrow v. Moskowitz, that the withdrawal 
of the money did not destroy the joint tenancy or the 
title of the survivor, if a joint tenancy had been created, 
but it does open the door to competent evidence that the 
tenancy created at the opening of the account was in 
truth something different from joint tenancy. The opin-
ion in Marrow v. Moskowitz is not lengthy and because of 
its importance, is set forth there in its entirety: 
CARDOZO, C. J. 
Defendants' testatrix, Fannie Manheimer, 
opened an account in the Yorkville Bank of New 
York City on October 3, 1923, in the name of 
((Pearl Harris or Fannie Manheimer, payable to 
either or survivor." Banking Law, Consol. Laws, 
c. 2249-, subd. 3. 
On January 19, 1925, she closed the account 
by withdrawing the entire fund and depositing it 
in a new account opened in her own name. 
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This action is brought by Pearl Harris, now 
Pearl Harris Marrow, against the executors of Mrs. 
Manheimer to establish as to the joint account a 
title by survivorship, and to recover to her own use 
the moneys withdrawn therefrom. 
This court in Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 
3 80, 167 N.E. 506, 66. A.L.R. 870 determined the 
interests of the same parties in other bank accounts 
opened in a like form. The opinions as the Appel-
late Division suggest some confusion of thought 
as to the effect of our ruling, and hence for greater 
certainty we state it again. 
( 1, 2) When a bank account is opened in the 
form prescribed by statute (Banking Law 249, 
subd. 3), a presumption at once arises that the 
interest of the depositors is that of joint tenants. 
Upon the death of one of the despositors, this pre-
sumption becomes conclusive in favor of the surv-
ivor in respect of any moneys then left in the 
account. It continues to be a mere presumption in 
respect of any moneys previously withdrawn. 
( 3) The moneys now in controversy were no 
longer in the account at the death of Mrs. Man-
heimer. They had been taken out during her life. 
The withdrawal did not destroy the joint tenancy 
or the title of the survivors, if a joint tenancy had 
been ·Created. It did, however, open the door to 
competent evidence, if any was available, that the 
tenancy created at the opening of the account was 
in truth something different from the tenancy de-
fined by the presumption. It had no other force. 
( 4) The defendants offered evidence in an at-
tempt to neutralize the presumption, but what 
was offered was properly rejected as being incom-
petent against the plaintiff. The evidence con-
sisted of statements made by Mrs. Manheimer to 
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nurses and others in the absence of the plaintiff 
after the account had been established. Such here-
say declarations were unavailing to divest a title, 
or to shatter the presumption that a title was in-
tended. Moskowitz v. Marrow, supra, at page 400 
of 251 N. Y., 167 N.E. 506; Tierney v. Fitzpa-
trick, 195 N.Y. 433, 434, 435, 88 N.E. 750; Mabie 
v. Bailey, 95 N.Y. 206. 211. 
The fact that Mrs. Manheimer was blind and 
helpless would indeed have been corroborating cir-
cumstance if evidence had been offered that by 
the agreement of the depositors the tenancy in its 
inception did not accord with the presumption. In 
the absence of other evidence, her disabilities were 
without significance. A corroborating circum-
stance is worthless when there is nothing to cor-
roborate. 
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. 
POUND, CRANE, LEHMAN, KELLOGG, 
Judgment affirmed. 
O'BRIEN, and HUBBS, JJ., concur. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO REBUT THE 
PRESUMPTION OF JOINT TENANCY CREATED 
BY THE AGREEMENTS OF THE PAR TIES IN ES-
TABLISHING THE JOINT SAVINGS ACCOUNTS. 
The appellants list under their Point IV (App. Br. 54-
55), their interpretation of evidence which they construed 
to rebut a presumption of gift. However, from the cases 
previously reviewed the problem is not confined to a ques-
tion of gift, but involves a question of whether there was 
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an intention to create a survivorship or joint tenancy re-
lationship. There was no evidence that the decedent at 
the time of making the accounts or thereafter did not 
intend that his wife become a joint tenant therein. 
We answer the ten items of evidence listed by appel-
lants on pages 54 and 55 of their brief numerically as fol-
lows: 
1. The appellants fail to mention the will of Decem-
ber 30, 1947, wherein Jim left $1,000.00 to each of his 
two brothers and one sister in Greece and left nothing at 
all to his brothers John and Peter in Salt Lake City after 
a life-time association with them (Exhibit D-7, R. 392). 
2. Mrs. Demiris was the natural recipient of his 
bounty as set forth in detail in our argument on Point II 
(supra p. 34) showing the many savings bonds and 
accounts placed in joint tenancy between September 1943 
and March 12, 1956. They were separated only 11 out of 
31 years, and this separation was with the full consent and 
approval of Jim, and was prolonged by reason of war and 
not by the desire of the parties. The only item of dispute 
mentioned by appellants' witnesses was that the defendant 
wanted Jim to go back to Greece to live with her during 
their retirement, and Jim did not want to go, according 
to the appellants' witnesses, even though he had a sick sis-
ter and two brothers still in Greece. There was no evidence 
that Jim found any other fault with his wife. 
3. Mrs. Demiris had no occasion to draw any money 
from the accounts, since although he was tttight" he usu-
ally gave her what she wanted within the limits of his con-
servative disposition (R. 169). Whether she drew on the 
accounts or not is immaterial. 
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4. Mrs. Demiris withdrew the money after her hus-
band was hospitalized for the stated reason that she was 
acting in accordance with the instructions of her husband 
(R. 179 and 112); that the money was hers (R. 112); 
and that the bank told her that any time she wanted to 
draw the money out she could (R. 114). 
5. Mrs. Demiris testified that she was mistaken as to 
the time the bonds had been cashed, and she testified in 
her deposition that she couldn't remember when they were 
cashed (R. 106). 
6. Mr. Long said that Mr. Demiris wanted his wife's 
name on the check that was mailed out to him, because he 
would like her to be able to cash the check in case he was 
~~sick or something" she could cash it and have some money 
(R. 3 2 3) , and that he wanted her to be able to cash it 
alone (R. 325). 
7. Mrs. Demas said that on the 6th or 7th of De-
cember, Jim told her that he had drawn the books and the 
money to his wife and then Mrs. Demas herself stated that 
she thought that was a good idea, because if he got sick 
his wife would look after him; but this was not the state-
ment of Mr. Demiris (R. 388). There was no such state-
ment, as inferred by appellant, that the reason Mr. Dem-
iris put the money in her hame was just to provide money 
in case of sickness. 
8. Mrs. Demiris could not remember talking with 
anybody about drawing money out of an account that had 
Jim's name only on it (R. 104) . If Alke Diamant had 
discussed joint tenancy with Mrs. Demiris as he said he 
did between August 1955 and April 1956 (R. 221-222), 
it is not likely that Mrs. Demiris would be making inquiry 
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from a tenant in the Oakwood apartments about a matter 
which she had already been told by an attorney. 
9. A witness who testified relative to the incident 
where Jim and his wife were having a discussion in front 
of the Western Union Building, said at (R. 228) that he 
thinks they were talking about going on a trip or some-
thing. Thus, under circumstances where Mrs. Demiris 
was trying to get Jim to take a vacation with her, and 
spend some of the money while he was alive, rather than 
leave it all to her after he died, really indicated that they 
had both discussed and agreed that she would get all of his 
money upon his death, and what she wanted him to do 
was to spend a little while he was living (R. 227). 
10. Mr. Demiris had spent a lifetime protecting his 
money from everyone. There was no evidence that he was 
ever generous with his brothers or sister and as recently as 
November 1956, was only sending his sick sister about 
$15.00 per month. He never showed any generosity to-
ward his brothers and sister. 
POINT V 
THE TWO DEPOSIT CARDS IN THE CONTI-
NENTAL BANK CREATED A JOINT TENANCY 
AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The appellants. under Point V, page 57 of their brief 
set forth the language on the cards signed at Continental 
Bank. These accounts are Exhibits P-12 and P-13. In 
addition to the printed material on said cards as quoted by 
the appellants, there was stamped on the signature card, 
of P-12 and on the ledger card of P-13, and on the bank 
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books themselves, the following phrase: ((This account 
is payable to the order of either of the depositors or to the 
order of the survivor." 
This question that these cards did not create a joint 
tenancy was raised for the first time by the appellants on 
appeal. In the pretrial order (R. 37 and 38) all of the 
accounts were treated as joint accounts and no distinction 
was made between the accounts with Continental Bank 
and other banks. All of the complaints, including the 
Third Amended Complaint of the appellants, stated at 
least in the first .cause of action that the accounts with 
Continental Bank were in joint tenancy. 
The words of survivorship used in these cards is suf-
ficient to create a joint tenancy. In the case of Neill vs. 
Royce, supra, in reviewing the history of joint tenancy, 
the Court quoted the stautory provision in the Revised 
Statutes of Utah 1933, relative to grants to two or more 
persons in their own right being tenancy in common, un-
less expressly declared in the grant to be otherwise, and 
the Court further stated as follows: 
HHowever, at all times where an expressed 
intention appeared on the face of the instrument 
indicating a joint tenancy, equity would allow the 
joint tenancy to prevail. In Hayes v. Kingdome, 
1 Vern. 33, 23 Eng. Rep. (Reprint) 288, where it 
appeared that cotenants contracted among them-
selves for a survivorship of their interests, equity 
gave force to their agreement by holding that they 
held as joint tenants." 
In 1953, by special amendment the Utah Legislature 
provided as follows: 
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((U.C.A. 57-1-5. GRANT TO TWO OR 
MORE - TENANCY IN COMMON PRE-
SUMED-JOINT TENANCY -CREATION OF 
JOINT TENANCY IN OWNER AND OTHERS 
-INTEREST OF JOINT TENANTS.-Every 
interest in real estate granted to two or more per-
sons in their own right shall be a tenancy in com-
mon, unless expressly declared in the grant to be 
otherwise. Use of words ((joint tenancy" or ((with 
rights of survivorship" or ((and to the survivor of 
them" or words of similar import shall declare a 
joint tenancy. A sole owner of real property shall 
create a joint tenancy in himself and another or 
others by making a transfer to himself and such 
other or others as joint tenants by use of such words 
as herein provided or by conveying to another per-
son or persons an interest in land in which an in-
terest in land in which an interest is retained by 
the grantor and by declaring the creation of a 
joint tenancy by use of such words as herein pro-
vided. In all cases the interest of joint tenants must 
be equal and undivided." 
In the case of Columbia Trust Co. vs. Anglum, 63 
Utah 354, 255 P. 1089, where the account was in the name 
of William J. or Mrs. William J. Anglum, husband and 
wife, the Court held that a joint ownership with the right 
of survivorship was created even without the use of the 
words survivorship. The Court quoted from R.C.L. page 
527 as follows: 
ult is well established that a bank account may 
be so fixed that two persons shall be joint owners 
thereof during their mutual lives, and the survivor 
take the whole on the death of the other. In creat-
ing a joint bank account with right of survivor-
ship, it is a matter of no importance that the 
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particular terms tjoint ownership' and tjoint ac-
count' are not used; the controlling question is 
whether the person opening the account inten-
tionally and intelligently created a condition em-
bracing the essential elements of joint ownership 
and survivorship. No particular formula is re-
quired, and courts will be controlled by the sub-
stance of the transaction rather than by the name 
given it." 
As stated by Justice Cordozo in his concurring opin-
ion in Moskowitz v. Marrow, a layman would be more in-
clined to understand the effect of a phrase which makes 
the account payable to either or the survivor than he would 
a statement that they were creating a joint tenancy. There 
can be little doubt that Mr. Demiris intended to create a 
joint tenancy in this case as he did in the others. He was 
required to sign a card which was presented to him by the 
bank as its own form to accomplish this purpose. 
POINT VI 
.THE FIN;QING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT 
THE WITHDRAWALS BY THE DEFENDANT DUR-
ING THE LIFETIME OF THE DE(:EDENT DID NOT 
TERMINATE THE JOINT TENANCY IS SUP-
PORTED BY BOTH THE FACTS AND THE LAW. 
The Steinmetz case cited by the appellants to support 
their contention that withdrawal of the funds prior to the 
death of James Demiris caused a severance, stands almost 
alone in the cases which have considered this point, and even 
in New Jersey, subsequent cases explain the narrow ground 
upon which the Steinmetz case was decided. 
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In 48 C.J.S. 929, it states that withdrawal of funds 
during the lifetime of both, by one joint tenant, either (a) 
creates a joint tenancy in the funds or property purchased 
with the funds, or (b) , gives property to withdrawer as 
his own. 
The New York decisions as stated in Marrow vs. 
Moskowitz which is set forth in its entirety, (supra) 
hold that the withdrawal of moneys merely opens the door 
to competent evidence that the tenancy created at the 
opening of the account was in truth something different 
from joint tenancy. Two subsequent New York cases, In 
Re Daranshinkey's Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 289, and Matter 
of Poranda 256 N.Y. 426, 176 N.E. 826, state the New 
York rule to be as follows: 
ttThe withdrawal of moneys from joint ac-
count does not destroy the joint tenancy if one was 
created; it merely opens the door to competent 
evidence, if available, that no joint tenancy was 
originally intended or created." 
The New York decisions are followed by the state of 
Oregon. In the case of State vs. Gralewski's estate, 176 Or. 
448, 159 P.2d 211 (1945), where John (father) placed 
money in joint accounts with Kirk (son). The father 
becomes incompetent. Son becomes ill and while ill draws 
all the money and disposes of it by will and dies before his 
father dies. Later the father dies and the State Land Board 
claims the funds by escheat in absence of heirs. The main 
question was whether the father, as survivor, was entitled 
to the funds which had been previously withdrawn by 
the son. The Oregon Court after reviewing many cases, 
held that they preferred the basis of decision of the New 
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York Courts and held in this .case there was no severance 
of the joint tenancy, but only results in a change of form, 
and the rights of the respective parties remain unaltered. 
The Court also held that recitals in the signature cards that 
the property is payable to either or the survivor was suf-
fi.cent to create a joint account with the right of survivor-
ship which it dealt with as a joint tenancy. 
The California Courts as stated in Doran vs. Hibernia 
Savings and Loan Soc., 80 Cal. App. 2d 790, 182 P.2d 630, 
hold as follows: 
tt (2, 3) In the case of a bank account it is 
settled in this state that even the destruction of 
the unity of title does not terminate the joint ten-
ancy." 
The opinion cites many other California cases which 
establish the principle in California that if money is taken 
from a joint tenancy account during the joint lives of the 
depositors, property acquired by the money so withdrawn, 
or another account into which the money is traced, will 
retain its character as property held in joint tenancy like 
the original fund, unless there has been a change in char-
acter by some agreement between the parties. 
In view of the appellants' reliance on the Steinmetz 
case we will now summarize the facts and holdings of the 
New Jersey Courts in the Steinmetz case and two sub-
sequent cases. 
(I.) In Steinmetz vs. Steinmetz, 130 N.J. Eq. 176, 
21 A2d 743, New Jersey (1941) the opinion was rendered 
by one Vice Chancellor. The case was a con test between 
the son of the decedent and the second wife of decedent 
arising when said wife withdrew the entire amounts in 
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two joint savings accounts which were in her name and the 
decedent's name, and redeposited said money in two new 
accounts in the name of herself and another woman. The 
withdrawal was made at a time when decedent was com-
mitted to a mental institution. The Court based its deci-
sion that the withdrawal severed the joint tenancy on two 
reasons: ( 1) The wife's action was an inequitable at-
tempt to deprive him of all interest therein, and (2) the 
four unities of interest, title, time, and possession must 
continue to exist in joint tenancy and she severed the unity 
of interest and possession. 
(2.) In the case of Stiles vs. Newchwander et al. 49 
A. 2d 572, (New Jersey 1946) the opinion was rendered 
by one Vice Chancellor. Miss N ewschwander had lived 
for 3 0 years with her brother Albert and wife. On Decem-
ber 1, 1941, she asked the bank to add the name of her 
brother to her account, making the same payable to either 
or the survivor, which was done. On September 26, 1944, 
she suffered a stroke from which she never recovered. On 
the same day Albert caused the money on deposit, $3500.-
00, to be transfered to an account in his own name, and 
five weeks later he added the name of his wife to the ac-
count. Then Miss Newschwander died February 5, 1945, 
at the age of 68 years. The administrator of her estate sued 
to impose a trust upon Albert in favor of the estate. The 
Court in holding that Albert could keep all the funds for 
himself, distinguished this case from the Steinmetz case 
by saying that the Steinmetz case found fraud and an in-
equitable attempt by one co-tenant to deprive another. 
However, Albert had no intention of depriving his sister 
and recognized the trust during her lifetime, and knew he 
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must provide for her living and care. The Court held that 
if Albert had died his sister would have survived to all, and 
whether the wife or his administrator would have acknowl-
edged Miss Newschwander's right cccannot be known." 
((But nothing in this case justifies a finding that Albert 
schemed to defraud his sister of her right of survivorship or 
any other right. Fraud is not presumed." (emphasis add-
ed). The Court said further that there was no equitable 
basis for charging Albert's title with any trust beyond the 
one he recognized and that the Steinmetz case did not 
apply. This case necessarily holds that there is no severance 
by withdrawal. 
(3.) The next New Jersey .case is that of Bremus vs. 
Forsatz, 5 New Jersey Superior 435, 69 A2d 557 (1949), 
a case wherein three judges participate in the decision. 
Tessie married Martin Bremus in 19 3 3. A savings account 
was opened in a bank in the names of Tessie or Martin 
Bremus, cceither or the survivor to draw" and the funds 
deposited belonged to Martin. On October 29, 1945, 
Tessie withdrew the balance of $1,767.81 and died in 1947, 
testate, leaving Martin $5.00 and all the rest to her sons by 
a previous marriage, John and Emil Forsatz. The lower 
Court held that when Tessie withdrew all, she converted 
the fund and severed the joint tenancy and thereby be-
came trustee of the other one-half. This was reversed on 
appeal, the court saying this case differs from the Steinmetz 
case in that in the Steinmetz case cca new account was 
opened in a form which was demonstrative of a derogation 
of the right to possession of the one suing to recover and 
was therefore a conversion. 
A review of even the New Jersey cases shows that 
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there is no severance by withdrawal from the joint savings 
account. In the instant case, Mrs. Demiris withdrew the 
funds pursuant to instructions from her husband, remained 
with him and cared for him during his illness and until 
his death, and in no way handled the funds in any manner 
which would be in derogation of the rights of James 
Demiris had he been restored to capacity prior to his death. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS BY WAY OF CROSS 
APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING 
THAT THE TRUST ACCOUNT AT AMERICAN 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION IN THE 
NAME OF JAMES DEMIRIS TRUSTEE FOR IPHI-
GENIA DEMIRIS FOR $1 o,ono.oo, FAILED FO'R 
WANT OF DONATIVE INTENT AND FAILED TO 
CREATE A TENANCY IN COMMON, IN THAT 
THE INSTRUMENT CREATING THE TRUST IT-
SELF PROVIDED FOR THE PAYMENT TO THE 
BENEFICIARY IRRESPECTIVE OF DONATIVE IN-
TENT OR THE CREATION OF SPECIAL TENAN-
CIES OTHER THAN THE TRUST ITSELF. AC-
CORDINGLY THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFFS UPON SAID 
TRUST ACCOUNT. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE DEFENDANT IN 
THAT THE WRITTEN INSTRUMENT SIGNED BY 
JAMES DEMIRIS CONSITUTED THE DEFENDANT, 
EITHER A JOINT TENANT OR AT LEAST A TEN-
ANT IN COMMON OF THE BALANCE DUE JAMES 
DEMIRIS ON THE ELMER BUTLER ACCOUNT. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
66 
ARGUMENT BY WAY OF CROSS 
APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING 
THAT THE TRUST ACCOUNT AT AMERICAN 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION IN THE 
NAME OF JAMES DEMIRIS TRUSTEE FOR IPHI-
GENIA DEMIRIS FOR $10,000.00, FAILED FOR 
WANT OF DONATIVE INTENT AND FAILED TO 
CREATE A TENANCY IN COMMON, IN THAT 
THE INSTRUMENT CREATING THE TRUST IT-
SELF PROVIDED FOR THE PAYMENT TO THE 
BENEFICIARY IRRESPECTIVE OF DONATIVE IN-
TENT OR THE CREATION OF SPECIAL TENAN-
CIES OTHER THAN THE TRUST ITSELF. AC-
CORDINGLY THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
JUDGMENT TO· THE PLAINTIFFS UPON SAID 
TRUST ACCOUNT. 
On about September 13, 1949, the decedent, James 
Demiris, opened an account with the American Savings 
and Loan Association, Account No. 0-6635 with a deposit 
of $4,637.44. He made regular deposits to said account, 
until the account was built up to about $10,000.00. On 
December 5, 19 56, the decedent changed said account 
from his own name to an account in the name of James 
Demiris, Trustee for lphigenia Demiris, his wife, bene-
ficiary, under the same Account No. 0-6635. At the 
time of changing the designation of the account, the de-
cedent signed a card provided by the American Savings 
and Loan Association (Exhibit P-16). The face of the card 
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shows James Demiris, Trustee, Account No. 0-6635 for 
lphigenia Demiris, his wife, beneficiary, and recites an 
application for an optional savings account in the 
American Savings and Loan Association, and in addition 
to some incidental recitals on the face of the card, shows 
the signature of James Demiris, P. 0. Box 1432, Salt 
Lake City, ((As Trustee for the above named beneficiary.'"' 
There is a notation at the bottom of the card, in paren-
theses ((See reverse side of card for Trust Agreement" and 
a further notation ((Discretionary, revocable trust ac-
count." 
The reverse side of the card provides in substance that 
in the event of the trustee's death, the Association could 
appoint a successor trustee and that the funds should 
ultimately be paid to the named beneficiary. 
The American Savings and Loan Asociation paid to 
lphigenia Demiris the $10,000.00 on February 19, 1957, 
pursuant to the provisions of the Trust (Exhibit P-16). 
Trusts of savings accounts have received special 
treatment by the Courts and have been generally termed 
((Totten Trust," following the decision of the Court of 
Appeals of New York In Re Totten (1904') 179 N. Y. 
112, 71 N. E. 748, in which the Court established the 
following doctrine: 
((A deposit by one person of his own money 
in his ·own name as trustee for another, standing 
alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust dur-
ing the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative 
trust, merely, revocable at will, until the depositor 
dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some 
unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery 
of the pass book or notice to the beneficiary. In 
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case the depositor dies before the beneficiary with-
out revocation, or some decisive act or declara-
tion of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that 
an absolute trust was created as to the balance on 
hand at the death of the depositor." 
Volume One, Scott on Trust Section 58.3, states 
the following: 
((There are numerous decisions in New York 
in which the doctrine of Matter of Totten has 
been followed and applied, and the beneficiary has 
been held entitled to the amount on deposit at the 
death of the depositor. There are decisions in other 
states in which tentative trusts of savings bank 
deposits have been upheld." The text then cites 
cases in California, Connecticut, Delaware, Dis-
trict of Columbia, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania. 
The Restatement of the Law of Trust, Section 58, 
states under caption ({Tentative Trust of Savings Deposits" 
as follows: 
uwhere a person makes a deposit in a savings 
account in a bank in his own name as trustee for 
another person intending to reserve a power to 
withdraw the whole or any part of the deposit at 
any time during his lifetime, and to use as his own, 
whatever he may withdraw, or otherwise to revoke 
the trust, the intended trust is enforcable by the 
beneficiary upon the death of the depositor as to 
any part remaining on deposit on his death, if he 
has not revoked the trust." 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the case of 
Cohen vs. Newton Savings Bank 67 N. E. 2d 748, 750; 320 
Mass 90, 168 A.L.R. 1321, reversed the trial court and 
enforced the trust in a case where an elderly gentleman 
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opened an account in his name in trust for his secretary. 
The decedent had signed a card, on the back of which, 
contained the following: ((This account I hold in trust 
to control and dispose of as I see fit during my lifetime, 
but on my death to pay to the beneficiary the full amount 
standing to the credit of this account. Lewis 0. Loche." 
He made many deposits and withdrawals; the secretary 
never knew of the account until after his death. The 
trial court found that the secretary never received the 
pass book, never had knowledge of the account until after 
death, that the testator intended to control and did con-
trol the account during his lifetime, and that ((As a fact 
that the testator did not intend to create a present interest 
in the account with the respondent Ernst." The Supreme 
Court held that though the findings of the lower court 
may be proper in other respects, it was ((plainly wrong" 
about the finding relative to lack of intention to create a 
trust. The Supreme Court held that this case differs from 
a situation where there is a deposit in the name of one 
person as trustee for another, without more. (tin the pres-
ent case, however, the declaration of trust is in writing 
and was signed by the testator. Its terms are expressly set 
out." The case was reversed with directions to honor the 
trust. 
The Supreme Court of Washington, in the matter of 
the estate of Morris A. Madsen, 296 P. 2d 518, 48 Wash. 
2d 675, followed the rule stated by the Restatement of the 
Law of Trust and the Totten Case in reversing the trial 
court in a case where the signature card signed by the 
decedent, provided as follows: 
((Funds in this account consitute a voluntary 
trust for Mamie Madsen revocable by me in whole 
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or. in part, at any time, by the withdrawal of funds. 
After my death, funds remaining in the account 
shall belong to the beneficiary absolutely. Both the 
beneficiary and myself shall be bound by the By-
Laws and other regulations of the Washington 
Mutual Savings Bank. (Signed) Morris Madsen." 
The Court went on to say: 
((In the instant case, there is no problem of the 
sufficiency of proof of intention. The written 
declaration of trust (quoted supra) is full and 
explicit, clear, unambiguous. It specifically identi-
fies decedent's intention to establish a revocable 
trust for the beneficiary. 
There is no evidence to the contrary." 
((We conclude that the written declaration of 
trust in the present case is sufficient to establish a 
valid trust for the benefit of the beneficiary named, 
the appellant, and that she is entitled to the funds 
involved." 
In the case of Boyle vs. Dinsdale, supra, This Court 
found an oral trust in a deposit in a bank wherein the 
entry was made upayable to George T. Pierce or Carolyn 
P. Dinsdale, and equal amount to each," being the children 
of the decedent. The trust was valid even though the de-
cedent retained the passbook and retained the right to 
the interest during her lifetime. This Utah case would 
seem to prove the principle of the Totten Trust. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE DEFENDANT IN 
THAT THE WRITTEN INSTRUMENT SIGNED BY 
JAMES DEMIRIS CONSTITUTED THE DEFEND-
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ANT EITHER A JOINT TENANT OR AT LEAST 
A TENANT IN COMMON OF THE BALANCE DUE 
JAMES DEMIRIS ON THE ELMER BUTLER AC-
COUNT. 
The Trust department of the First Security Bank of 
Utah, 4th South Branch, had in its possession a note in 
the original principal sum of $54,300.00, payable to 
James Demiris and executed by Elmer and Minerva Butler. 
On December 23, 1949, the decedent signed a letter ad-
dressed to First Security Bank of Utah N.A., Exchange 
Place Branch, Attention Trust Department, which was 
signed and a.ccepted by Ralph D. Cowan, Trust Officer, 
wherein the decedent deposited in trust the said note, 
mortgage, abstract, release of note and mortgage, and in-
structed the Bank to collect what was due under the note 
and to pay: 
2741400 to James Demiris 
63/400 to Peter Demiris 
63 I 400 to John Demiris 
The Bank made collections under said note and distributed 
the same in accordance with the foregoing proportions 
until the death of the decedent, at which time the balance 
due upon said note was the total sum of $23,832.00, and 
the proportion belonging to the decedent was $16,77 4.21. 
On December 10, 1956, the decedent and the defend-
ant went to the First Security Bank, at the 4th South 
Branch, Trust Department. The decedent talked with 
Mr. Floyd R~ Long in the Trust Department, and stated 
that he desired his wife's name to be put on the check in 
case he should get sick or something she could have money. 
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Whereupon, Mr. Floyd R. Long prepared the follow-
ing document which was signed by the decedent and the 
defendant: 
First Security Bank of Utah N.A. 
Trust Dept., Fourth South Branch 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Gentlemen: 
With respect to the account you are collecting 
from Mr. Elmer Butler, we the undersigned, hereby 
express our desire to have the portion heretofore 




I phigenia Demir is 
sl James Demiris 
James Demiris 
s/I phigenia Demiris 
I phigenia Demiris 
Mr. Cowan testified that he is Trust Officer of the 
First Security Bank of Utah, and that in December, 
1949, the promissory note from Mr. and Mrs. Butler 
payable to James Demiris was placed with the First Se-
curity Bank for collection pursuant to instructions con-
tained in Exhibit P-1 (R. 404). He said the Bank was 
in possession of the note and mortgage and were making 
collection and distributing to James, Peter and John in 
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accordance with their ownership in the property which 
was sold, and in the note. After the death of James De-
miris they continued to make collections as before and 
have maintained only one file and one account, and the 
only change since the death of James Demiris was that 
the remittance of the James Demiris portion was retained 
by the executor (R. 405). 
Under the foregoing circumstances Mr. Demiris 
could not obtain possession of the note for the purpose of 
endorsing it over to his wife and apparently any dealing 
he would make with respect to the note would have to be 
by separate instrument. It would appear that Exhibit D-20 
prepared by Mr. Long on December 10, 1956, with in-
structions that if Mr. Demiris should get sick or something, 
he wanted his wife to have the money, the said exhibit 
D-20 accomplished passing title to Mrs. Demiris under one 
or more of the following theories: 
(1.) Under the theory of Boyle vs. Dinsdale, supra, 
the bank became the Trustee to make payment in accord-
ance with the instructions and upon the death of James 
Demiris was required to continue to make payments to 
Mrs. Demiris. 
(2.) Under the theory of Columbia Trust Company 
vs. Anglum, supra, where the deposit in the name of H. 
or W., they being husband and wife, established joint 
ownership with the right of survivorship, the intention 
being controlling; where Mr. Demiris said if he should 
get sick or something, he wanted his wife to have the 
money, it would seem to be an undue limitation on his 
intention to say that under the circumstances he only 
intended for her to get the money so long as he was sick, 
but not if he passed away. 
..., 
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(3.) In the case of Thatcher vs. Merriam, 121 Utah 
191, 240 P. 2d 266, the decedent made an assignment, in 
consideration of love and affection, to his three sisters of 
a certain note, mortgage and chattel mortgage, and re-
tained the possession of the note, mortgage and chattel 
mortgage and received the payments during his lifetime. 
The note was for $70,000.00 and the heirs brought suit 
to have the assignment declared void for reasons that the 
decedent retained control of the note, and that he did 
not endorse the note, which they contended made the 
assignment inoperative. This Court held the assignment 
valid, saying that there was no necessity for complying 
with the formal requirements of a will; that an assign-
ment of the note and mortgage can be made though the 
assignor retains possession until his death; that an assign-
ment of a note may be formal or informal and may be by 
separate instrument or even by parol, whether the assign-
ment is made by way of gift or for consideration; and 
that where a maker retains possession of the note with the 
intent to hold it for the benefit and as agent of the payee, 
there is constructive delivery of the note. 
Mr. Long testified that he made just an original of 
Exhibit D-20 and that he retained the original (R. 326-
327). Under the doctrine of the Thatcher case, Mr. 
Demiris made a valid assignment or negotiation of his 
interest in the note under the circumstances of retention 
of the note and mortgage by the bank for purposes of col-
lection for James, John and Peter Demiris. If Mr. Demiris 
did not intend that she have the funds after his death it 
would seem that he would have placed such a specific 
limitation in his request to Mr. Long for the preparation 
of Exhibit D-20. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
trial court should be modified by reversing the judgment 
entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant 
upon the Trust Account No. 0-6635 with American 
Savings and Loan Association and by awarding judgment 
to the defendant upon her counter-claim for the portion 
of the Elmer Butler note, which belonged to James 
Demiris and which was being collected by First Security 
Bank. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY, and NEBEKER 
THORNLEY K. SWAN 
GEORGE K. FADEL 
Attorneys for the Respondent and 
Cross Appellant 
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UNIVERSITY UTAH 
v. 
f J L I=" Ap '":~5R9Y JUN 9-~~ -auf\ro .. 
No. 8982 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, 
DEMIRIS 
----······-------·----·-············-------·-------·-······----Clerk, Suprome Court, Utah 
(insert following page 53, Respondent's 
Brief) 
NEWLY UNCOVERED CASES 
PROPOSITION: U. S. SAVINGS BONDS REGIS-
TERED IN NAME OF TWO PER-
SONS IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
BECOME THE PROPERTY OF THE 
SURVIVOR OR ONE FIRST PRE-
SENTING THEM FOR PAYMENT. 
The Court is respectfully requested, 
pursuant to provisions of Sec. 78-25-1, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, to take Judi-
cial notice of United States Treasury 
Department Regulations, Department Cir-
cular No. 530, which are codified as 
Part 315 of Code of Federal Regulations. 
Section 315.60 provides in part as 
follows: 
"Sec. 315.60. During the lives of 
both coowners.---A sav1ngs bond regis-
tered in coownership form, for example, 
"John A. Jones or Mrs. Mary C. Jones," 
will be paid or reissued during the 
lives of both, as follows: 
(a) PAYMENT.--The bond will be paid 
to either upon his separate request, and 
upon payment to him the other shall cease 
to have any interest in the bond. If 
both request payment jointly, payment 
will be made by check drawn to their 
order iointly, for example, "John A. 
Jones AND Mrs. Mary C. Jones." 
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Section 315.61 provides as follows: 
"Sece 315.61. AFTER THE DEATH OF ONE 
OR BOTH COOWNERS.--If either coowner dies 
without the bond having been presented and 
surrendered for payment or authorised re-
issue, the survivor will be recognized 
as the sole and absolute ovner. There-
after, payment or reissue will be made as 
though the bond were registered in the 
name of the surTivor alone (see Subpart 
K), except that a request for reissue by 
him must be supported by proof of death 
of the other coowner, and except further 
that after the death of the eurTivor proof 
of death of both coowners and of the order 
in which they died will be required. The 
presentation and surrender of a bond by 
one coowner for payment establishes his 
right to receive the proceeds of the bond, 
and if he ~hould die before the transac-
tion is completed, payment will be made 
to the legal representative of, or persons 
entitled to, his estate in accordanee with 
the provisions of Subpart N. If either 
coowner dies after the bond has been 
presented and surrendered for authorized 
reissue {see Sec. 315.47), the bond will 
be regarded as though reissued during his 
lifetime." 
The United States Savings Bonds were 
Contracts between the United States and 
the named coowners and the federal law · 
must govern the meaning of the bonds and 
the rights thereto, and no state law can 
vary the terms of federal obligations. 
Treasury Regulations being enacted pursuant 
to Congressional Act, become the law of the 
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lando Connell vQ Bauer, 240 Minne 280, 
61 NW 2d 177, 40 ALR 2d, 776c 
It is further stated in 37 ALR 
2d 1221~ at 1229~ as follows: 
•1 4~-~BASES FOR MAJORITY VIEWc 
(a) Treasury Ragttl~ltions as part 
of contract .. 
The principal basis for the majority 
viev is that Bolution of the question as 
to the property rights of the surTiving 
co=owner is not one of gift but of con-
tractp and that Treasury Regulations~ 
having the force and effect of federal 
law!) become a part of,the bonds as a 
corrcra.ct between the fiUrchaser and the 
f~deral gov~rnment, and are determinative 
of the property rights of the parties to 
the bondso" 
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